Related papers: Dynamic Evidence Disclosure: Delay the Good to Acc…
We study the design of information acquisition games-environments where a designer contracts their action on Sender's choice of experiment and the realized signals about some state-and identify which predictions can be made absent knowledge…
I examine how a decision maker can incentivize an expert to reveal novel actions, expanding the set from which he can choose, without making ex-ante commitments regarding as-of-yet unrevealed actions. The outcomes achievable by any…
A sender seeks to persuade a receiver by presenting evidence obtained through a sequence of private experiments. The sender has complete flexibility in his choice of experiments, contingent on the private experimentation history. The sender…
Although companies are exhorted to provide more information to the financial community, it is evident that they choose different paths based upon their strategic emphasis and competitive environments. Our investigation explores the…
Modern supply networks are complex interconnected systems. Multi-agent models are increasingly explored to optimise their performance. Most research assumes agents will have full observability of the system by having a single policy…
Peer prediction mechanisms are often adopted to elicit truthful contributions from crowd workers when no ground-truth verification is available. Recently, mechanisms of this type have been developed to incentivize effort exertion, in…
We propose a new principal-agent framework where a principal communicates a roadmap -- a set of plausible outcome models and a prior belief over them -- to guide an agent who is learning the value of innovation. The agent trusts the prior…
Reinforcement-learning agents seek to maximize a reward signal through environmental interactions. As humans, our job in the learning process is to design reward functions to express desired behavior and enable the agent to learn such…
Fairness in machine learning has predominantly been studied in static classification settings without concern for how decisions change the underlying population over time. Conventional wisdom suggests that fairness criteria promote the…
A committee consisting of two factions is considering a project whose distributive consequences are unknown. This uncertainty can be resolved at some unknown future time. By delaying approval, the committee can gradually learn which faction…
We introduce \emph{informational punishment} to the design of mechanisms that compete with an exogenous status quo mechanism: Players can send garbled public messages with some delay, and others cannot commit to ignoring them. Optimal…
To make decisions organisms often accumulate information across multiple timescales. However, most experimental and modeling studies of decision-making focus on sequences of independent trials. On the other hand, natural environments are…
A sender flexibly acquires evidence--which she may pay a third party to certify--to disclose to a receiver. When evidence acquisition is overt, the receiver observes the evidence gathering process irrespective of whether its outcome is…
We study the impact of endogenous attention in a dynamic social media model. Each period, a user observes a random story and decides whether to share it. Users like sharing true and interesting stories, but identifying false stories…
We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain.…
Delayed rewards problem in contextual bandits has been of interest in various practical settings. We study randomized allocation strategies and provide an understanding on how the exploration-exploitation tradeoff is affected by delays in…
Does a more transparent climate disclosure policy induce lower emissions? This paper examines the welfare implications of transparency in climate disclosure regulation. Increased disclosure transparency could result in a larger equilibrium…
We study optimal information provision in transportation networks when users are strategic and the network state is uncertain. An omniscient planner observes the network state and discloses information to the users with the goal of…
The time needed to exchange information in the physical world induces a delay term when the respective system is modeled by differential equations. Time delays are hence ubiquitous, being furthermore likely to induce instabilities and with…
This paper develops a model of \textit{identification design} and applies it to robust causal inference in microeconometrics. The decision maker observes the population distribution of signals generated by an information structure and ranks…