Related papers: Moral Hazard with Network Effects
Professional networks -- the social networks among people in a given line of work -- can serve as a conduit for job prospects and other opportunities. Here we propose a model for the formation of such networks and the transfer of…
In this paper, we address three Principal--Agent problems in a moral hazard context and show that they are connected. We start by studying the problem of Principal with multiple Agents in cooperation. The term cooperation is manifested here…
We study the behavior of for-profit institutions that broadcast reputations to foster trust among market participants. We develop a theoretical model in which buyers and sellers are matched on a platform to engage in transactions involving…
In an effort to understand why individuals choose to participate in personally-expensive pro-environmental behaviors, environmental and behavioral economists have examined a moral-motivation model in which the decision to adopt a…
I introduce dynamic correlation as an incentive instrument to address moral hazard. A firm mediates interactions between a long-lived worker and short-lived clients. I show that optimal mediation induces a nonstationary correlated…
Closeness is a global measure of centrality in networks, and a proxy for how influential actors are in social networks. In most network models, and many empirical networks, closeness is strongly correlated with degree. However, in social…
We study a continuous time contracting model in which a principal hires a risk averse agent to manage a project over a finite horizon and provides sequential payments whose timing is endogenously determined. The resulting nonzero-sum…
We examine settings in which agents choose behaviors and care about their neighbors' behaviors, but have incomplete information about the network in which they are embedded. We develop a model in which agents use local knowledge of their…
We consider the classic principal-agent model of contract theory, in which a principal designs an outcome-dependent compensation scheme to incentivize an agent to take a costly and unobservable action. When all of the model…
We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal…
We study a principal-agent team production model. The principal hires a team of agents to participate in a common production task. The exact effort of each agent is unobservable and unverifiable, but the total production outcome (e.g. the…
The issue of missing network links in partially observed networks is frequently neglected in empirical studies. This paper addresses this issue when investigating the spillovers of program benefits in the presence of network interactions.…
We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget. The agent has a private type determining their cost function. This paper endogenizes the value of the resource driving…
Malicious softwares or malwares for short have become a major security threat. While originating in criminal behavior, their impact are also influenced by the decisions of legitimate end users. Getting agents in the Internet, and in…
This paper investigates the moral hazard problem in finite horizon with both continuous and lump-sum payments, involving a time-inconsistent sophisticated agent and a standard utility maximiser principal. Building upon the so-called dynamic…
Information diffusion and influence maximization are important and extensively studied problems in social networks. Various models and algorithms have been proposed in the literature in the context of the influence maximization problem. A…
The solution of today's complex problems requires the grouping of task forces whose members are usually connected remotely over long physical distances and different time zones. Hence, understanding the effects of imposed communication…
Communication is fundamental to sustaining reciprocity and cooperation in strategic interactions. We identify and formulate the influence attribution problem as the central optimization difficulty inherent in such dynamics for a learning…
Employers are concerned not only with a prospective worker's ability, but also their propensity to avoid shirking. This paper proposes a new experimental framework to study how Principals trade-off measures of ability and prosocial behavior…
Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring…