Related papers: On constrained matchings, stable under random pref…
Two-sided popular matchings in bipartite graphs are a well-known generalization of stable matchings in the marriage setting, and they are especially relevant when preference lists are incomplete. In this case, the cardinality of a stable…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
In 1976, Knuth asked if the stable marriage problem (SMP) can be generalized to marriages consisting of 3 genders. In 1988, Alkan showed that the natural generalization of SMP to 3 genders ($3$GSM) need not admit a stable marriage. Three…
Consider the stable matching problem on two sets. We introduce the concept of a preference cycle and show how its natural presence in stable matchings proves a series of classical results in an elementary way.
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
We consider the stable matching problem (e.g. between doctors and hospitals) in a one-to-one matching setting, where preferences are drawn uniformly at random. It is known that when doctors propose and the number of doctors equals the…
In the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), a set of $2n$ agents rank one another in a linear order. The goal is to find a matching that is stable: one that has no pair of agents who mutually prefer each other over their assigned partners. We…
For a set $A$ of $n$ people and a set $B$ of $m$ items, with each person having a preference list that ranks all items from most wanted to least wanted, we consider the problem of matching every person with a unique item. A matching $M$ is…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well…
We improve the upper bound for the maximum possible number of stable matchings among $n$ jobs and $n$ applicants from $131072^n+O(1)$ to $3.55^n+O(1)$. To establish this bound, we state a novel formulation of a certain entropy bound that is…
We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
Stable marriage of a two-sided market with unit demand is a classic problem that arises in many real-world scenarios. In addition, a unique stable marriage in this market simplifies a host of downstream desiderata. In this paper, we explore…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = \left( A \cup B, E \right)$. In the one-sided model, every $a \in A$ (often called agents) ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and no $b \in B$ has any preference order over its neighbours $y \in…
We say a natural number $n$ is matchable if there is a bijection from the set of $\tau(n)$ divisors of $n$ to the set $\{1,2,\dots,\tau(n)\}$, where corresponding numbers are relatively prime. We show that the set of matchable numbers has…