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We study the problem of assigning agents to the vertices of a graph such that no pair of neighbors can benefit from swapping assignments -- a property we term neighborhood stability. We further assume that agents' utilities are based solely…
People choose friendships with people similar to themselves, i.e. they sort by resemblence. Economic studies have shown when sorting is optimal and constitute an equilibrium, however, this presumes lack of beneficial spillovers. We…
A number of prototypical optimization problems in multi-agent systems (e.g., task allocation and network load-sharing) exhibit a highly local structure: that is, each agent's decision variables are only directly coupled to few other agent's…
We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the…
Motivated by the increasing interest in the explicit representation and handling of various "preference" structures arising in modern digital economy, this work introduces a new class of "one-to-many stable-matching" problems where a set of…
We study the problem in which a central planner sequentially allocates a single resource to multiple strategic agents using their utility reports at each round, but without using any monetary transfers. We consider general agent utility…
This article presents a set of tools for the modeling of a spatial allocation problem in a large geographic market and gives examples of applications. In our settings, the market is described by a network that maps the cost of travel…
In this paper we study the problem of allocating a scarce resource among several players (or agents). A central decision maker wants to maximize the total utility of all agents. However, such a solution may be unfair for one or more agents…
We study fairness in house allocation, where $m$ houses are to be allocated among $n$ agents so that every agent receives one house. We show that maximizing the number of envy-free agents is hard to approximate to within a factor of…
We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where each agent deems their allocated portion relative to their…
We study the classical rent division problem, where $n$ agents must allocate $n$ indivisible rooms and split a fixed total rent $R$. The goal is to compute an envy-free (EF) allocation, where no agent prefers another agent's room and rent…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a…
Object rearrangement is a fundamental problem in robotics with various practical applications ranging from managing warehouses to cleaning and organizing home kitchens. While existing research has primarily focused on single-agent…
This paper considers the problem of shaping agent utility functions in a transactive energy system to ensure the optimal energy price at a competitive equilibrium is always socially acceptable, that is, below a prescribed threshold. Agents…
Mechanism design for a social utility being the sum of agents' utilities (SoU) is a well-studied problem. There are, however, a number of problems of theoretical and practical interest where a designer may have a different objective than…
We introduce an extension of the Optimal Transport problem when multiple costs are involved. Considering each cost as an agent, we aim to share equally between agents the work of transporting one distribution to another. To do so, we…
We consider transferable-utility profit-sharing games that arise from settings in which agents need to jointly choose one of several alternatives, and may use transfers to redistribute the welfare generated by the chosen alternative. One…
We take the classic facility location problem and consider a variation, in which each agent's individual cost function is equal to their distance from the facility multiplied by a scaling factor which is determined by the facility…
We put forward a new model of congestion games where agents have uncertainty over the routes used by other agents. We take a non-probabilistic approach, assuming that each agent knows that the number of agents using an edge is within a…
We analyze the run-time complexity of computing allocations that are both fair and maximize the utilitarian social welfare, defined as the sum of agents' utilities. We focus on two tractable fairness concepts: envy-freeness up to one item…