Related papers: Equilibrium Selection for Multi-agent Reinforcemen…
Cybersecurity defense involves interactions between adversarial parties (namely defenders and hackers), making multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) an ideal approach for modeling and learning strategies for these scenarios. This paper…
To achieve general intelligence, agents must learn how to interact with others in a shared environment: this is the challenge of multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL). The simplest form is independent reinforcement learning (InRL), where…
We initiate the study of how to perturb the reward in a zero-sum Markov game with two players to induce a desirable Nash equilibrium, namely arbitrating. Such a problem admits a bi-level optimization formulation. The lower level requires…
In the real world, people/entities usually find matches independently and autonomously, such as finding jobs, partners, roommates, etc. It is possible that this search for matches starts with no initial knowledge of the environment. We…
There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) addresses sequential decision-making problems with multiple agents, where each agent optimizes its own objective. In many real-world instances, the agents may not only want to optimize their…
Multiagent learning is a necessary yet challenging problem as multiagent systems become more prevalent and environments become more dynamic. Much of the groundbreaking work in this area draws on notable results from game theory, in…
Model-based reinforcement learning (RL), which finds an optimal policy using an empirical model, has long been recognized as one of the corner stones of RL. It is especially suitable for multi-agent RL (MARL), as it naturally decouples the…
Although multi-agent reinforcement learning can tackle systems of strategically interacting entities, it currently fails in scalability and lacks rigorous convergence guarantees. Crucially, learning in multi-agent systems can become…
Mean field games (MFG) and mean field control problems (MFC) are frameworks to study Nash equilibria or social optima in games with a continuum of agents. These problems can be used to approximate competitive or cooperative games with a…
We introduce the LLM-Nash framework, a game-theoretic model where agents select reasoning prompts to guide decision-making via Large Language Models (LLMs). Unlike classical games that assume utility-maximizing agents with full rationality,…
Traditional centralized multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms are sometimes unpractical in complicated applications, due to non-interactivity between agents, curse of dimensionality and computation complexity. Hence, several…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning has made substantial empirical progresses in solving games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample complexity for finding a Nash equilibrium in general-sum games…
This paper presents an algorithmic framework for learning robust policies in asymmetric imperfect-information games, where the joint reward could depend on the uncertain opponent type (a private information known only to the opponent itself…
Multi-agent robust reinforcement learning, also known as multi-player robust Markov games (RMGs), is a crucial framework for modeling competitive interactions under environmental uncertainties, with wide applications in multi-agent systems.…
Learning stationary policies in infinite-horizon general-sum Markov games (MGs) remains a fundamental open problem in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). While stationary strategies are preferred for their practicality, computing…
In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from…
We propose a reinforcement learning algorithm for stationary mean-field games, where the goal is to learn a pair of mean-field state and stationary policy that constitutes the Nash equilibrium. When viewing the mean-field state and the…
To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How…
We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…