Related papers: Shesha: Multi-head Microarchitectural Leakage Disc…
The timing characteristics of cache, a high-speed storage between the fast CPU and the slowmemory, may reveal sensitive information of a program, thus allowing an adversary to conduct side-channel attacks. Existing methods for detecting…
Modern microarchitectures are some of the world's most complex man-made systems. As a consequence, it is increasingly difficult to predict, explain, let alone optimize the performance of software running on such microarchitectures. As a…
Recent studies highlighting the vulnerability of computer architecture to information leakage attacks have been a cause of significant concern. Among the various classes of microarchitectural attacks, cache timing channels are especially…
Intel SGX (Software Guard Extension) is a promising TEE (trusted execution environment) technique that can protect programs running in user space from being maliciously accessed by the host operating system. Although it provides hardware…
Microarchitectural timing channels enable unwanted information flow across security boundaries, violating fundamental security assumptions. They leverage timing variations of several state-holding microarchitectural components and have been…
As machine learning models become increasingly deployed across the edge of internet of things environments, a partitioned deep learning paradigm in which models are split across multiple computational nodes introduces a new dimension of…
MicroScope, and microarchitectural replay attacks in general, take advantage of the characteristics of speculative execution to trap the execution of the victim application in an infinite loop, enabling the attacker to amplify a…
Recent security vulnerabilities that target speculative execution (e.g., Spectre) present a significant challenge for processor design. The highly publicized vulnerability uses speculative execution to learn victim secrets by changing cache…
Transient Execution Attacks (TEAs) have gradually become a major security threat to modern high-performance processors. They exploit the vulnerability of speculative execution to illegally access private data, and transmit them through…
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a promising hardware-based technology for protecting sensitive computations from potentially compromised system software. However, recent research has shown that SGX is vulnerable to branch-shadowing…
The run-time electromagnetic (EM) emanation of microprocessors presents a side-channel that leaks the confidentiality of the applications running on them. Many recent works have demonstrated successful attacks leveraging such side-channels…
Detecting weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms is of utmost importance for designing secure information systems. The state-of-the-art soft analytical side-channel attack (SASCA) uses physical leakage information to make probabilistic…
Various studies among side-channel attacks have tried to extract information through leakages from electronic devices to reach the instruction flow of some appliances. However, previous methods highly depend on the resolution of traced…
Memory leaks are prevalent in various real-world software projects, thereby leading to serious attacks like denial-of-service. Though prior methods for detecting memory leaks made significant advance, they often suffer from low accuracy and…
In this paper, we reveal the existence of a new class of prefetcher, the XPT prefetcher, in the modern Intel processors which has never been officially documented. It speculatively issues a load, bypassing last-level cache (LLC) lookups,…
Cache template attacks demonstrated automated leakage of user input in shared libraries. However, for large binaries, the runtime is prohibitively high. Other automated approaches focused on cryptographic implementations and media software…
Correctness for microprocessors is generally understood to be conformance with the associated instruction set architecture (ISA). This is the basis for one of the most important abstractions in computer science, allowing hardware designers…
This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…
Existing tools to detect side-channel attacks on Intel SGX are grounded on the observation that attacks affect the performance of the victim application. As such, all detection tools monitor the potential victim and raise an alarm if the…
Modern processors are highly optimized systems where every single cycle of computation time matters. Many optimizations depend on the data that is being processed. Software-based microarchitectural attacks exploit effects of these…