Related papers: Third Degree Price Discrimination Under Costly Inf…

A monopolist faces a partially uninformed population of consumers, interconnected through a directed social network. In the network, the monopolist offers rewards to informed consumers (influencers) conditional on informing uninformed…

A multiproduct seller is more informed than consumers about the value of her products to consumers. The seller posts a price list and segments the market through cheap-talk communication. We find that when both seller's and consumers'…

A seller offers a buyer a schedule of transfers and associated product qualities. After observing this schedule, the buyer chooses a flexible costly signal about his type. We show it is without loss to focus on a class of mechanisms that…

We study information disclosure in competitive markets with adverse selection. Sellers privately observe product quality, with higher quality entailing higher production costs, while buyers trade at the market-clearing price after observing…

We study the optimal pricing strategy of a monopolist selling homogeneous goods to customers over multiple periods. The customers choose their time of purchase to maximize their payoff that depends on their valuation of the product, the…

Consumers in many markets are uncertain about firms' qualities and costs, so buy based on both the price and the quality inferred from it. Optimal pricing depends on consumer heterogeneity only when firms with higher quality have higher…

Recommendation, information retrieval, and other information access systems pose unique challenges for investigating and applying the fairness and non-discrimination concepts that have been developed for studying other machine learning…

This paper examines when the public provision of information in search markets improves welfare. I consider a two-sided frictional search market in which buyers match with vertically differentiated sellers. The market is segmented into…

In many shopping scenarios, e.g., in online shopping, customers have a large menu of options to choose from. However, most of the buyers do not browse all the options and make decision after considering only a small part of the menu. To…

Since there is, in principle, no reason why third parties should not pay individuals for the use of their data, we introduce a realistic market that would allow these payments to be made while taking into account the privacy attitude of the…

Information is replicable in that it can be simultaneously consumed and sold to others. We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. We show that even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures…

We consider a model of a data broker selling information to a single agent to maximize his revenue. The agent has a private valuation of the additional information, and upon receiving the signal from the data broker, the agent can conduct…

In financial markets valuable information is rarely circulated homogeneously, because of time required for information to spread. However, advances in communication technology means that the 'lifetime' of important information is typically…

Data has been increasingly recognized as a critical factor in the future economy. However, constructing an efficient data trading market faces challenges such as privacy breaches, data monopolies, and misuse. Despite numerous studies…

Mobility-on-Demand platforms are a fast growing component of the urban transit ecosystem. Though a growing literature addresses the question of how to make individual MoD platforms more efficient, much less is known about the cost of market…

This work addresses the buyer's inspection paradox for information markets. The paradox is that buyers need to access information to determine its value, while sellers need to limit access to prevent theft. To study this, we introduce an…

We study a model of competitive information design in an oligopoly search market with heterogeneous consumer search costs. A unique class of equilibria -- upper-censorship equilibria -- emerges under intense competition. In equilibrium,…

A defining feature of digital goods is that replication and degradation are costless: once a high-quality good is produced, low-quality versions can be created and distributed at no additional cost. This paper studies quality-based…

Motivated by agentic markets -- two-sided markets in which consumers and businesses are assisted by AI tools that facilitate consumers' search -- we study the impact of improved search technology on learning and welfare in markets. We put…

We study statistical discrimination of individuals based on payoff-irrelevant social identities in markets that utilize ratings and recommendations for social learning. Even though rating/recommendation algorithms can be designed to be fair…