Related papers: Sponsored Search Auction Design Beyond Single Util…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
Understanding bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions remains an ongoing challenge for researchers. Despite their widespread use, theoretical insights into the bidding behavior, revenue ranking, and efficiency of commonly used multi-unit…
We study how to enable auctions in the big data context to solve many upcoming data-based decision problems in the near future. We consider the characteristics of the big data including, but not limited to, velocity, volume, variety, and…
With the increasing use of auctions in online advertising, there has been a large effort to study seller revenue maximization, following Myerson's seminal work, both theoretically and practically. We take the point of view of the buyer in…
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, namely identifying a single mechanism that has near optimal performance on every prior distribution. We show that mechanisms with truthtelling equilibria, a.k.a., revelation…
One natural constraint in the sponsored search advertising framework arises from the fact that there is a limit on the number of available slots, especially for the popular keywords, and as a result, a significant pool of advertisers are…
We present a general framework for designing approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms for multi-item additive auctions, which applies to both truthful and non-truthful auctions. Given a (not necessarily truthful) single-item auction format…
We study autobidding ad auctions with user costs, where each bidder is value-maximizing subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the social welfare taking into consideration the user's cost of…
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…
Internet search results are a growing and highly profitable advertising platform. Search providers auction advertising slots to advertisers on their search result pages. Due to the high volume of searches and the users' low tolerance for…
Mechanism design for a social utility being the sum of agents' utilities (SoU) is a well-studied problem. There are, however, a number of problems of theoretical and practical interest where a designer may have a different objective than…
We model a procurement scenario in which two \textit{imperfect} bidders act simultaneously on behalf of a single buyer, a configuration common in display advertising and referred to as \textit{side-by-side bidding} but largely unexplored in…
Distributed energy resources (DERs), such as rooftop solar panels, are growing rapidly and are reshaping power systems. To promote DERs, feed-in-tariff (FIT) is usually adopted by utilities to pay DER owners certain fixed rates for…
Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user population. Unfortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform. In this paper, we examine the following basic question in the context…
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic…
We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…
We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve prices, however, usually do not help improve total…
In a sponsored search auction, decisions about how to rank ads impose tradeoffs between objectives such as revenue and welfare. In this paper, we examine how these tradeoffs should be made. We begin by arguing that the most natural solution…
We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price…