Related papers: Network Threshold Games
In this paper, we use a model of large random network game where the agents plays selfishly and are affected by their neighbors, to explore the conditions under which the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game is affected by a perturbation in…
Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…
We develop a game theoretical model of $N$ heterogeneous interacting agents called the intelligent minority game. The ``intelligent'' agents play the basic minority game and depending on their performances, generate new strategies using the…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
Subtraction games have a rich literature as normal-play combinatorial games (e.g., Berlekamp, Conway, and Guy, 1982). Recently, the theory has been extended to zero-sum scoring play (Cohensius et al. 2019). Here, we take the approach of…
Empirical studies suggest a deep intertwining between opinion formation and decision-making processes, but these have been treated as separate problems in the study of dynamical models for social networks. In this paper, we bridge the gap…
The ability to achieve coordinated behavior -- engineered or emergent -- on networked systems has attracted widespread interest over several fields. This interest has led to remarkable advances in developing a theoretical understanding of…
We consider the control of decentralized learning dynamics for agents in an anti-coordination network game. In the anti-coordination network game, there is a preferred action in the absence of neighbors' actions, and the utility an agent…
We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium of constrained network aggregative games to changes in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the players. This setting is motivated by two applications. The first is the…
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…
In this work, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is nontrivial, as some authors found that heterogeneity sustains cooperation, while others obtained…
To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing players in the hope of successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible…
Wireless communication networks are becoming highly virtualized with two-layer hierarchies, in which controllers at the upper layer with tasks to achieve can ask a large number of agents at the lower layer to help realize computation,…
This paper studies the action dynamics of network coordination games with bounded-rational agents. I apply the experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model to the analysis as the EWA model has several free parameters that can capture…
Threshold cascade models have been used to describe spread of behavior in social networks and cascades of default in financial networks. In some cases, these networks may have multiple kinds of interactions, such as distinct types of social…
We consider a simple game, the $k$-regular graph game, in which players take turns adding edges to an initially empty graph subject to the constraint that the degrees of vertices cannot exceed $k$. We show a sharp topological threshold for…
In this paper, we present a unifying framework for analyzing equilibria and designing interventions for large network games sampled from a stochastic network formation process represented by a graphon. We first introduce a new class of…
Recently, Apt and Markakis introduced a model for product adoption in social networks with multiple products, where the agents, influenced by their neighbours, can adopt one out of several alternatives (products). To analyze these networks…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
Algorithmic game theory (AGT) focuses on the design and analysis of algorithms for interacting agents, with interactions rigorously formalized within the framework of games. Results from AGT find applications in domains such as online…