Related papers: Network Threshold Games
Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…
Fairness is desirable yet challenging to achieve within multi-agent systems, especially when agents differ in latent traits that affect their abilities. This hidden heterogeneity often leads to unequal distributions of wealth, even when…
Threshold-driven models and game theory are two fundamental paradigms for describing human interactions in social systems. However, in mimicking social contagion processes, models that simultaneously incorporate these two mechanisms have…
Complex networks are a great tool for simulating the outcomes of different strategies used within the iterated prisoners' dilemma game. However, because the strategies themselves rely on the connection between nodes, then initial network…
A repeated network game where agents have quadratic utilities that depend on information externalities -- an unknown underlying state -- as well as payoff externalities -- the actions of all other agents in the network -- is considered.…
This paper presents new families of algorithms for the repeated play of two-agent (near) zero-sum games and two-agent zero-sum stochastic games. For example, the family includes fictitious play and its variants as members. Commonly, the…
In the simplest game-theoretic formulation of Schelling's model of segregation on graphs, agents of two different types each select their own vertex in a given graph so as to maximize the fraction of agents of their type in their occupied…
In this paper I present several algorithmic techniques for improving the decision process of multiple types of agents behaving in environments where their interests are in conflict. The interactions between the agents are modelled by using…
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…
Game-theoretic centrality is a flexible and sophisticated approach to identify the most important nodes in a network. It builds upon the methods from cooperative game theory and network theory. The key idea is to treat nodes as players in a…
The \((n,k)\) game models a group of \(n\) individuals with binary opinions, say 1 and 0, where a decision is made if at least \(k\) individuals hold opinion 1. This paper explores the dynamics of the game with heterogeneous agents under…
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…
We consider control of heterogeneous players repeatedly playing an anti-coordination network game. In an anti-coordination game, each player has an incentive to differentiate its action from its neighbors. At each round of play, players…
An active line of research has considered games played on networks in which payoffs depend on both a player's individual decision and also the decisions of her neighbors. Such games have been used to model issues including the formation of…
We study a random game in which two players in turn play a fixed number of moves. For each move, there are two possible choices. To each possible outcome of the game we assign a winner in an i.i.d. fashion with a fixed parameter p. In the…
In this paper, we introduce past-aware game-theoretic centrality, a class of centrality measures that captures the collaborative contribution of nodes in a network, accounting for both uncertain and certain collaborators. A general…
We investigate a game-theoretic model of a social system where both the rules of the game and the interaction structure are shaped by the behavior of the agents. We call this type of model, with several types of feedback couplings from the…
Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…
We study biased Maker-Breaker positional games between two players, one of whom is playing randomly against an opponent with an optimal strategy. In this work we focus on the case of Breaker playing randomly and Maker being "clever". The…
We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with…