Related papers: Games under the Tiered Deferred Acceptance Mechani…
We study secretary problems in settings with multiple agents. In the standard secretary problem, a sequence of arbitrary awards arrive online, in a random order, and a single decision maker makes an immediate and irrevocable decision…
We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a…
In this paper, we study the problem of the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of N-player games over jointly strongly connected switching networks. The action of each player is governed by a class of uncertain nonlinear systems. Our…
Consider a static wireless network that has two tiers with different priorities: a primary tier vs. a secondary tier. The primary tier consists of randomly distributed legacy nodes of density $n$, which have an absolute priority to access…
Schelling's famous model of segregation assumes agents of different types who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
We study two-sided matching markets in which one side of the market (the players) does not have a priori knowledge about its preferences for the other side (the arms) and is required to learn its preferences from experience. Also, we assume…
Diverse schools can help address implicit biases and increase empathy, mutual respect, and reflective thought by fostering connections between students from different racial/ethnic, socioeconomic, and other backgrounds. Unfortunately,…
We study the evolution of two mutually interacting games with both pairwise games as well as the public goods game on different topologies. On 2d square lattices, we reveal that the game-game interaction can promote the cooperation…
Trust is one of the cornerstones of human society. One of the evolutionary pressure mechanisms that may have led to its emergence is the presence of incentives for trustworthy behavior. However, this type of reward has received relatively…
The paper discusses the strategy-proofness of sports tournaments with multiple group stages, where the results of matches already played in the previous round against teams in the same group are carried over. These tournaments, widely used…
In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…
Action and observation delays exist prevalently in the real-world cyber-physical systems which may pose challenges in reinforcement learning design. It is particularly an arduous task when handling multi-agent systems where the delay of one…
Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical game theory, e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multi-player matrix games. As recently shown by Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to infinite games…
We study how school choice mechanisms shape wealth segregation in the long term by endogenizing residential choice. Families buy houses in school zones that determine admission priority, experience shocks to school preferences, and…
Federated Learning is an important emerging distributed training paradigm that keeps data private on clients. It is now well understood that by controlling only a small subset of FL clients, it is possible to introduce a backdoor to a…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
The double slit experiment provides a clear demarcation between classical and quantum theory, while multi-slit experiments demarcate quantum and higher-order interference theories. In this work we show that these experiments pertain to a…
Addressing the large inefficiencies generated by the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism requires priority violations, but which ones are justifiable? The leading approach is to ask individuals if they consent to waive their priority…