Related papers: Welfare Loss in Connected Resource Allocation
I study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous goods when monetary transfers are prohibited. Agents have private values, and the designer chooses a mechanism subject to incentive compatibility and aggregate supply constraints. I…
Communication or influence networks are probably the most controllable of all factors that are known to impact on the problem-solving capability of task-forces. In the case connections are costly, it is necessary to implement a policy to…
The problem of fair division of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem of social choice. Recently, the problem was extended to the case when goods form a graph and the goal is to allocate goods to agents so that each agent's bundle…
We investigate, at the fundamental level, the questions of `why', `when' and `how' one could or should reach out to poor and vulnerable people to support them in the absence of governmental institutions. We provide a simple and new approach…
We study the efficiency of mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource. Given scalar signals submitted by all users, such a mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that each user will receive and a payment that will be collected…
Equitable allocation of indivisible items involves partitioning the items among agents such that everyone derives (almost) equal utility. We consider the approximate notion of \textit{equitability up to one item} (EQ1) and focus on the…
The fair allocation of mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, has been a prominent topic of study in economics and computer science. We define an allocation as fair if its utility vector minimizes a symmetric…
In this report we construct two mechanisms that fully implement social welfare maximising allocation in Nash equilibria for the case of a single infinitely divisible good subject to multiple inequality constraints. The first mechanism…
We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a network. An instance is given by $m$ messages (physical objects) which have to be transported between specified source-target pairs in a weighted…
This paper studies algorithmic decision-making in the presence of strategic individual behaviors, where an ML model is used to make decisions about human agents and the latter can adapt their behavior strategically to improve their future…
Distributed optimization for resource allocation problems is investigated and a sub-optimal continuous-time algorithm is proposed. Our algorithm has lower order dynamics than others to reduce burdens of computation and communication, and is…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items to agents that have arbitrary entitlements to the items. Every agent $i$ has a valuation function $v_i$ and an entitlement $b_i$, where entitlements sum up to~1. Which…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…
A combinatorial market consists of a set of indivisible items and a set of agents, where each agent has a valuation function that specifies for each subset of items its value for the given agent. From an optimization point of view, the goal…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of $m$ indivisible items to a group of $n$ agents with subsidy (money). Our work mainly focuses on the allocation of chores but most of our results extend to the allocation of goods as well. We…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of heterogeneous divisible resources among agents with different preferences. We focus on the setting where the resources correspond to the edges of a connected graph, every agent must be…
This two-part paper addresses the design of retail electricity tariffs for distribution systems with distributed energy resources such as solar power and storage. In particular, the optimal design of dynamic two-part tariffs for a regulated…
We present pricing mechanisms for several online resource allocation problems which obtain tight or nearly tight approximations to social welfare. In our settings, buyers arrive online and purchase bundles of items; buyers' values for the…
In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied…
We study efficiency loss in Bayesian revenue optimal auctions. We quantify this as the worst case ratio of loss in the realized social welfare to the social welfare that can be realized by an efficient auction. Our focus is on auctions with…