Related papers: Population dynamics and games of variable size
Commuters looking for the shortest path to their destinations, the security of networked computers, hedge funds trading on the same stocks, governments and populations acting to mitigate an epidemic, or employers and employees agreeing on a…
Existing theoretical models of evolution focus on the relative fitness advantages of different mutants in a population while the dynamic behavior of the population size is mostly left unconsidered. We here present a generic stochastic model…
In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
Real populations are seldom found at the Nash equilibrium strategy. The present work focuses on how population size can be a relevant evolutionary force diverting the population from its expected Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept…
Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic…
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…
Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population has been investigated in this study. Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic replicator dynamics under the assumption…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…
System Dynamics (SD) main aim is to study dynamic behavior of systems based on causal relations. The other purpose of the science is to design policies, both in initial values and causal relation, to change system behavior as we desire.…
We review research papers which use game theory to model the decision making of individuals during an epidemic, attempting to classify the literature and identify the emerging trends in this field. We show that the literature can be…
Evolutionary games are a developing sub-field of game theory. This branch of game theory is used in the study of the adaptation of large, but finite, populations of agents to changes in the environment. It assumes that each agent has no…
Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended…
Evolutionary game theory has proven to be an elegant framework providing many fruitful insights in population dynamics and human behaviour. Here, we focus on the aspect of behavioural plasticity and its effect on the evolution of…
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…