Related papers: A Negotiator's Backup Plan: Optimal Concessions wi…
Small operators who take part in secondary wireless spectrum markets typically have strict budget limits. In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions. In existing…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
This paper introduces a new negotiating agent model for automated negotiation. We focus on applications without time pressure with multidi-mensional negotiation on both continuous and discrete domains. The agent bidding strategy relies on…
We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has shown that every agent can guarantee $1/2$ of their ideal…
We study the problem of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a selfish mediator who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. We consider a setting where the mediator does not have information advantage and the buyer's…
We propose a decentralized auction-based algorithm for the solution of dynamic task allocation problems for spatially distributed multi-agent systems. In our approach, each member of the multi-agent team is assigned to at most one task from…
The submodular maximization problem is widely applicable in many engineering problems where objectives exhibit diminishing returns. While this problem is known to be NP-hard for certain subclasses of objective functions, there is a greedy…
In this work, we study the multi-agent decision problem where agents try to coordinate to optimize a given system-level objective. While solving for the global optimal is intractable in many cases, the greedy algorithm is a well-studied and…
In modern advertising platforms, learning algorithms are deployed by budget-constrained bidders to maximize their accumulated value. These algorithms often offer classical utility guarantees like no-regret, i.e., the agent's utility is at…
This paper showcases an improved architecture for a complete negotiation system that permits multi party multi issue negotiation. The concepts of multithreading and concurrency has been utilized to perform parallel execution. The…
We address the problem of improving bidders' strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions and introduce a simple and generic method to design novel bidding strategies if the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. We…
Ransomware attacks have become a pervasive and costly form of cybercrime, causing tens of millions of dollars in losses as organizations increasingly pay ransoms to mitigate operational disruptions and financial risks. While prior research…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
We study the problem of finding the optimal bidding strategy for an advertiser in a multi-platform auction setting. The competition on a platform is captured by a value and a cost function, mapping bidding strategies to value and cost…
Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their…
We propose a projected gradient dynamical system as a model for a bargaining scheme for an asset for which the two interested agents have personal valuations which do not initially coincide. The personal valuations are formed using…
In collaborative planning activities, since the agents are autonomous and heterogeneous, it is inevitable that conflicts arise in their beliefs during the planning process. In cases where such conflicts are relevant to the task at hand, the…
A large fraction of online advertisement is sold via repeated second price auctions. In these auctions, the reserve price is the main tool for the auctioneer to boost revenues. In this work, we investigate the following question: Can…
In Bayesian single-item auctions, a monotone bidding strategy--one that prescribes a higher bid for a higher value type--can be equivalently represented as a partition of the quantile space into consecutive intervals corresponding to…
In this paper, we study a matching market model on a bipartite network where agents on each side arrive and depart stochastically by a Poisson process. For such a dynamic model, we design a mechanism that decides not only which agents to…