Related papers: The Division Problem of Chances
In recent years, differential privacy has emerged as the de facto standard for sharing statistics of datasets while limiting the disclosure of private information about the involved individuals. This is achieved by randomly perturbing the…
We study the mechanism design problem in the setting where agents are rewarded using information only. This problem is motivated by the increasing interest in secure multiparty computation techniques. More specifically, we consider the…
This paper studies a decentralized many-to-one matching market where preferences remain uncertain during the matching process. Institutions initiate matching by sending offers, and applicants decide whether to accept upon receiving them.…
We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one-by-one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these items. Many existing offline mechanisms do not work in this…
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how some fixed value should be shared among them. We are interested in settings where the share that each agent receives is based on how that agent is evaluated by other members of…
We study the classic problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among a group of agents, and focus on the notion of approximate proportionality known as PROPm. Prior work showed that there exists an allocation that satisfies…
How to distribute welfare in a society is a key issue in the subject of distributional justice, which is deeply involved with notions of fairness. Following a thought experiment by Dworkin, this work considers a society of individuals with…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
Allocating indivisible items among a set of agents is a frequently studied discrete optimization problem. In the setting considered in this work, the agents' preferences over the items are assumed to be identical. We consider a very recent…
In priority-based matching, serial dictatorship (SD) is simple, strategyproof, and Pareto efficient, but not free of justified envy (i.e. fair). This paper studies how to fairly order agents in SD as a function of their priorities. I show…
We consider the task of allocating indivisible items to agents, when the agents' preferences over the items are identical. The preferences are captured by means of a directed acyclic graph, with vertices representing items and an edge…
The advent of powerful prediction algorithms led to increased automation of high-stake decisions regarding the allocation of scarce resources such as government spending and welfare support. This automation bears the risk of perpetuating…
We study classic fair-division problems in a partial information setting. This paper respectively addresses fair division of rent, cake, and indivisible goods among agents with cardinal preferences. We will show that, for all of these…
We consider the problem of dividing limited resources to individuals arriving over $T$ rounds. Each round has a random number of individuals arrive, and individuals can be characterized by their type (i.e. preferences over the different…
In this paper we consider a network of processors aiming at cooperatively solving linear programming problems subject to uncertainty. Each node only knows a common cost function and its local uncertain constraint set. We propose a…
We study the fair division problem on divisible heterogeneous resources (the cake cutting problem) with strategic agents, where each agent can manipulate his/her private valuation in order to receive a better allocation. A…
The problem of fair division known as "cake cutting" has been the focus of multiple papers spanning several decades. The most prominent problem in this line of work has been to bound the query complexity of computing an envy-free outcome in…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…