Related papers: SIGY: Breaking Intel SGX Enclaves with Malicious E…
Intel's software guard extensions (SGX) provide hardware enclaves to guarantee confidentiality and integrity for sensitive code and data. However, systems leveraging such security mechanisms must often pay high performance overheads. A…
Intel SGX enables memory isolation and static integrity verification of code and data stored in user-space memory regions called enclaves. SGX effectively shields the execution of enclaves from the underlying untrusted OS. Attackers cannot…
Intel SGX (Software Guard Extension) is a promising TEE (trusted execution environment) technique that can protect programs running in user space from being maliciously accessed by the host operating system. Although it provides hardware…
Malware attacks are a significant part of the new software security threats detected each year. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are a set of hardware instructions introduced by Intel in their recent lines of processors that are…
Intel SGX Guard eXtensions (SGX), a hardware-supported trusted execution environment (TEE), is designed to protect security-sensitive applications. However, since enclave applications are developed with memory unsafe languages such as…
Side-channel risks of Intel's SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces page faults to observe the page-level access patterns of a…
Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a hardware-based technology for ensuring security of sensitive data from disclosure or modification that enables user-level applications to allocate protected areas of memory called enclaves. Such…
We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are an integral part of modern secure processors. They ensure that their application and code pages are confidential, tamper proof and immune to diverse types of attacks. In 2021, Intel suddenly…
Many users implicitly assume that software can only be exploited after it is installed. However, recent supply-chain attacks demonstrate that application integrity must be ensured during installation itself. We introduce SIGL, a new tool…
In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-channel attack against Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), called a branch shadowing attack, which can reveal fine-grained control flows (i.e., each branch) of an enclave program running…
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a promising hardware-based technology for protecting sensitive computations from potentially compromised system software. However, recent research has shown that SGX is vulnerable to branch-shadowing…
Recent attacks have broken process isolation by exploiting microarchitectural side channels that allow indirect access to shared microarchitectural state. Enclaves strengthen the process abstraction to restore isolation guarantees. We…
New trusted computing primitives such as Intel SGX have shown the feasibility of running user-level applications in enclaves on a commodity trusted processor without trusting a large OS. However, the OS can still compromise the integrity of…
Besides Intel's SGX technology, there are long-running discussions on how trusted computing technologies can be used to cloak malware. Past research showed example methods of malicious activities utilising Flicker, Trusted Platform Module,…
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this…
Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) offers software applications enclave to protect their confidentiality and integrity from malicious operating systems. The SSL/TLS protocol, which is the de facto standard for protecting transport-layer…
Hardware-based Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer an isolation granularity of virtual machine abstraction. They provide confidential VMs (CVMs) that host security-sensitive code and data. AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX enable CVMs and…
The latest generation of Intel processors supports Software Guard Extensions (SGX), a set of instructions that implements a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) right inside the CPU, by means of so-called enclaves. This paper presents…
A protocol for two-party secure function evaluation (2P-SFE) aims to allow the parties to learn the output of function $f$ of their private inputs, while leaking nothing more. In a sense, such a protocol realizes a trusted oracle that…