Related papers: Testing the simplicity of strategy-proof mechanism…
Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
Policy gradient methods, which have been extensively studied in the last decade, offer an effective and efficient framework for reinforcement learning problems. However, their performances can often be unsatisfactory, suffering from…
Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such…
Eliciting reliable human feedback is essential for many machine learning tasks, such as learning from noisy labels and aligning AI systems with human preferences. Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize truthful reporting without ground…
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of…
We study the design of information acquisition games-environments where a designer contracts their action on Sender's choice of experiment and the realized signals about some state-and identify which predictions can be made absent knowledge…
We consider turn-based game arenas for which we investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve bundles of plays, that arise from some semantical motive. Typically, we can represent constraints on allowed…
A rich class of mechanism design problems can be understood as incomplete-information games between a principal who commits to a policy and an agent who responds, with payoffs determined by an unknown state of the world. Traditionally,…
We design two mechanisms that ensure that the majority preferred option wins in all equilibria. The first one is a simultaneous game where agents choose other agents to cooperate with on top of the vote for an alternative, thus overcoming…
We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of…
Many of the challenges facing today's reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms, such as robustness, generalization, transfer, and computational efficiency are closely related to compression. Prior work has convincingly argued why minimizing…
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct…
In the principal-agent problem formulated by Myerson'82, agents have private information (type) and make private decisions (action), both of which are unobservable to the principal. Myerson pointed out an elegant linear programming solution…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects to agents when agents have strict preferences over objects. There are inherent trade-offs between competing notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives in assignment mechanisms.…
We analyze the relation between strategy-proofness and preference reversal in the case that agents may declare indifference. Interestingly, Berga and Moreno (2020), have recently derived preference reversal from group strategy-proofness of…
Optimal auctions maximize a seller's expected revenue subject to individual rationality and strategyproofness for the buyers. Myerson's seminal work in 1981 settled the case of auctioning a single item; however, subsequent decades of work…
A menu description exposes strategyproofness by presenting a mechanism to player $i$ in two steps. Step (1) uses others' reports to describe $i$'s menu of potential outcomes. Step (2) uses $i$'s report to select $i$'s favorite outcome from…
We study the efficiency (in terms of social welfare) of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching problems with {\em dichotomous preferences} and {\em normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences}. We are particularly…
Considering some predictive mechanisms, we show that ultrafast average-consensus can be achieved in networks of interconnected agents. More specifically, by predicting the dynamics of the network several steps ahead and using this…