Related papers: Oracle-Augmented Prophet Inequalities

While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the properties that optimal solutions need to have, and devised a…

The ``impossibility theorem'' -- which is considered foundational in algorithmic fairness literature -- asserts that there must be trade-offs between common notions of fairness and performance when fitting statistical models, except in two…

Despite having the same basic prophet inequality setup and model of loss aversion, conclusions in our multi-dimensional model differs considerably from the one-dimensional model of Kleinberg et al. For example, Kleinberg et al. gives a…

In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…

Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…

We investigate prophet inequalities with competitive ratios approaching $1$, seeking to generalize $k$-uniform matroids. We first show that large girth does not suffice: for all $k$, there exists a matroid of girth $\geq k$ and a prophet…

The classical algorithms for online learning and decision-making have the benefit of achieving the optimal performance guarantees, but suffer from computational complexity limitations when implemented at scale. More recent sophisticated…

Given a sequence of random variables ${\bf X}=X_1,X_2,\ldots$ suppose the aim is to maximize one's return by picking a `favorable' $X_i$. Obviously, the expected payoff crucially depends on the information at hand. An optimally informed…

We introduce and study Swap Agnostic Learning. The problem can be phrased as a game between a predictor and an adversary: first, the predictor selects a hypothesis $h$; then, the adversary plays in response, and for each level set of the…

We study a Bayesian persuasion game where a sender wants to persuade a receiver to take a binary action, such as purchasing a product. The sender is informed about the (real-valued) state of the world, such as the quality of the product,…

Online bidding is a classical problem in online decision-making, with applications in resource allocation, hierarchical clustering, and the analysis of approximation algorithms. We study its randomized learning-augmented variant, where an…

We show that quantum oracles provide an advantage over classical oracles for answering classical counterfactual questions in causal models, or equivalently, for identifying unknown causal parameters such as distributions over functional…

Prophet inequalities are a useful tool for designing online allocation procedures and comparing their performance to the optimal offline allocation. In the basic setting of $k$-unit prophet inequalities, the well-known procedure of Alaei…

Alice holds an random variable $X$, and Bob is trying to guess its value by asking questions of the form "is $X=x$?". Alice answers truthfully and the game terminates once Bob guesses correctly. Before the game begins, Bob is allowed to…

We present new tradeoffs between space and query-time for exact distance oracles in directed weighted planar graphs. These tradeoffs are almost optimal in the sense that they are within polylogarithmic, sub-polynomial or arbitrarily small…

Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…

The oracle property of model selection procedures has attracted a large volume of favorable publications in the literature, but also faced criticisms of being ineffective and misleading in applications. In this paper, we introduce a class…

Given a set of $m$ agents and a set of $n$ items, where agent $A$ has utility $u_{A,i}$ for item $i$, our goal is to allocate items to agents to maximize fairness. Specifically, the utility of an agent is the sum of its utilities for items…

Our work studies the fair allocation of indivisible items to a set of agents, and falls within the scope of establishing improved approximation guarantees. It is well known by now that the classic solution concepts in fair division, such as…

This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…