Related papers: Subjective Equilibria under Beliefs of Exogenous U…
We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in which each player chooses her decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a…
We consider a finite horizon repeated game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In each period,…
We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study structured perfect Bayesian equilibria…
We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…
We study finite normal-form games in which payoffs are subject to random perturbations and players face uncertainty about how these shocks co-move across actions, an ambiguity that naturally arises when only realized (not counterfactual)…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a…
Strategic multi-agent systems are fundamentally characterized by decentralization, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Agents operating under limited observations will often need to make decisions based on simplified internal models of the…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…
This paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model where agents exhibit a strong form of belief heterogeneity: they disagree about zero probability events. It is shown that, somewhat surprisingly, equilibrium exists in this setting, and that…
We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In this dynamics, a belief estimate of the parameter is repeatedly updated given players' strategies and realized…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…
The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…
We consider a non-zero-sum linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) dynamic game with asymmetric information. Each player observes privately a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world $V$, resulting in dependent private observations. We study…
The paper studies one-shot two-player games with non-Bayesian uncertainty. The players have an attitude that ranges from optimism to pessimism in the face of uncertainty. Given the attitudes, each player forms a belief about the set of…
We study linear quadratic dynamic games where players are uncertain about each other's control policies or goals and consequently seek to be strategically robust. Building on recent work on strategically robust and risk-averse game theory,…
This paper introduces a framework for finite non-cooperative games where each player faces a globally uncertain parameter with no common prior. Every player chooses both a mixed strategy and projects an emergent subjective prior to the…
In dynamic games with asymmetric information structure, the widely used concept of equilibrium is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This is expressed as a strategy and belief pair that simultaneously satisfy sequential rationality and…
We introduce a new paradigm for game theory -- Bayesian satisfaction. This novel approach is a synthesis of the idea of Bayesian rationality introduced by Aumann, and satisfaction games. The concept of Bayesian rationality for which, in…