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We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is…
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…
Offshore wind energy is rapidly expanding, facilitated largely through auctions run by governments. We provide a detailed quantified overview of applied auction schemes, including geographical spread, volumes, results, and design…
We consider the problem of designing revenue-optimal auctions for selling two items and bidders' valuations are independent among bidders but negatively correlated among items. In this paper, we obtain the closed-form optimal auction for…
We briefly review our recent studies on stochastic processes modelling internet on-line trading. We present a way to evaluate the average waiting time between the observation of the price in financial markets and the next price change,…
We study the problem of designing revenue-maximizing auctions for allocating multiple goods to flexible consumers. In our model, each consumer is interested in a subset of goods known as its flexibility set and wants to consume one good…
A key challenge in combinatorial auctions is designing bid formats that accurately capture agents' preferences while remaining computationally feasible. This is especially true for electricity auctions, where complex preferences complicate…
We study independent private values auction environments in which the auctioneer's revenue depends nonlinearly on bidders' interim winning probabilities. Our framework accommodates heterogeneity among bidders and places no ad hoc…
We address online learning in complex auction settings, such as sponsored search auctions, where the value of the bidder is unknown to her, evolving in an arbitrary manner and observed only if the bidder wins an allocation. We leverage the…
Auction design for the modern advertising market has gained significant prominence in the field of game theory. With the recent rise of auto-bidding tools, an increasing number of advertisers in the market are utilizing these tools for…
To facilitate responsive and cost-effective computing service delivery over edge networks, this paper investigates a novel two-stage double auction methodology via discovering an interesting idea of resource overbooking to overcome dynamic…
In financial markets, the order flow, defined as the process assuming value one for buy market orders and minus one for sell market orders, displays a very slowly decaying autocorrelation function. Since orders impact prices, reconciling…
In this study, we focus on the market clearing problem of Turkish day-ahead electricity market. We propose a mathematical model by extending the variety of bid types for different price regions. The commercial solvers may not find any…
We study Arbitrum's Express Lane Auction (ELA), an ahead-of-time second-price auction that grants the winner an exclusive latency advantage for one minute. Building on a single-round model with risk-averse bidders, we propose a hypothesis…
We provide a constructive proof of Border's theorem [Bor91, HR15a] and its generalization to reduced-form auctions with asymmetric bidders [Bor07, MV10, CKM13]. Given a reduced form, we identify a subset of Border constraints that are…
We consider a repeated auction where the buyer's utility for an item depends on the time that elapsed since his last purchase. We present an algorithm to build the optimal bidding policy, and then, because optimal might be impractical, we…
We study how a budget-constrained bidder should learn to adaptively bid in repeated first-price auctions to maximize her cumulative payoff. This problem arose due to an industry-wide shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions…
Crowdsourcing markets like Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) make it possible to task people with small jobs, such as labeling images or looking up phone numbers, via a programmatic interface. MTurk tasks for processing datasets with humans…
Analysis of efficiency of outcomes in game theoretic settings has been a main item of study at the intersection of economics and computer science. The notion of the price of anarchy takes a worst-case stance to efficiency analysis,…
We study the asymptotic average-case efficiency of static and anonymous posted prices for $n$ agents and $m(n)$ multiple identical items with $m(n)=o\left(\frac{n}{\log n}\right)$. When valuations are drawn i.i.d from some fixed continuous…