Related papers: Information Sale on Network
This paper analyzes the behavior of selfish transmitters under imperfect location information. The scenario considered is that of a wireless network consisting of selfish nodes that are randomly distributed over the network domain according…
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…
The advent of intelligent agents who produce and consume energy by themselves has led the smart grid into the era of "prosumer", offering the energy system and customers a unique opportunity to revaluate/trade their spot energy via a…
Big data has been emerging as a new approach in utilizing large datasets to optimize complex system operations. Big data is fueled with Internet-of-Things (IoT) services that generate immense sensory data from numerous sensors and devices.…
We use a principal-agent model to analyze the structure of a book-driven dealer market when the dealer faces competition from a crossing network or dark pool. The agents are privately informed about their types (e.g. their portfolios),…
The identification of the minimal set of nodes that maximizes the propagation of information is one of the most relevant problems in network science. In this paper, we introduce a new method to find the set of initial spreaders to maximize…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
We study the problem of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a selfish mediator who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. We consider a setting where the mediator does not have information advantage and the buyer's…
A seller wants to sell an item to $n$ buyers. Buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution unknown to the seller; the seller only knows that the support is included in $[a, b]$. To be robust, the seller chooses a DSIC mechanism…
A wireless system with multiple channels is considered, where each channel has several transmission states. A user learns about the instantaneous state of an available channel by transmitting a control packet in it. Since probing all…
We present a novel framework to learn functions that estimate decisions of sellers and buyers simultaneously in an oligopoly market for a price-sensitive product. In this setting, the aim of the seller network is to come up with a price for…
We study a model of competitive information design in an oligopoly search market with heterogeneous consumer search costs. A unique class of equilibria -- upper-censorship equilibria -- emerges under intense competition. In equilibrium,…
We examine receiver-optimal mechanisms for aggregating information divided across many biased senders. Each sender privately observes an unconditionally independent signal about an unknown state, so no sender can verify another's report. A…
A monopolist faces a partially uninformed population of consumers, interconnected through a directed social network. In the network, the monopolist offers rewards to informed consumers (influencers) conditional on informing uninformed…
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller's auction. Motivated by blockchain auctions, online…
Motivated by online platforms such as job markets, we study an agent choosing from a list of candidates, each with a hidden quality that determines match value. The agent observes only a noisy ranking of the candidates plus a binary signal…
This chapter provides a comprehensive and self-contained discussion of the most recent developments of information theory of networks. Maximum entropy models of networks are the least biased ensembles enforcing a set of constraints and are…
Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a uniform…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents in an online setting, where goods arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. Focusing on the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness, proportionality, and…
A data intermediary acquires signals from individual consumers regarding their preferences. The intermediary resells the information in a product market wherein firms and consumers tailor their choices to the demand data. The social…