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This study investigates the self-rationalization framework constructed with a cooperative game, where a generator initially extracts the most informative segment from raw input, and a subsequent predictor utilizes the selected subset for…
Two-player (antagonistic) games on (possibly stochastic) graphs are a prevalent model in theoretical computer science, notably as a framework for reactive synthesis. Optimal strategies may require randomisation when dealing with inherently…
This paper is the first in series of four papers that present an analytical approach to war using game theory. We try to explore why is it that "true peace" can't be achieved and all or any efforts we make towards that goal will have huge…
In a game of permutation wordle, a player attempts to guess a secret permutation in the fewest number of guesses possible. Previously, Samuel Kutin and Lawren Smithline (arXiv:2408.00903) introduced this game and proposed a strategy called…
Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for…
We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
Betting games provide a natural setting to capture how information yields strategic advantage. The Kelly criterion for betting, long a cornerstone of portfolio theory and information theory, admits an interpretation in the limit of…
Level-k thinking has been widely applied as a solution concept for games in normal form in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider level-k thinking in games in extensive form. Player's may learn about levels of opponents'…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…
We investigate an alternative concept of Nash equilibrium, m-equilibrium, which slightly resembles Harsanyi-Selten risk dominant equilibrium although it is a different notion. M-equilibria provide nontrivial solutions of normal form games…
Candogan et al. (2011) provide an orthogonal direct-sum decomposition of finite games into potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. In this paper we study the issue of decomposing games that are strategically equivalent from a…
Prior research has explored potential applications of video games in programming education to elicit computational thinking skills. However, existing approaches are often either too general, not taking into account the diversity of genres…
Examining games from a fresh perspective we present the idea of game-inspired and game-based algorithms, dubbed "gamorithms".
When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a…
Recent studies revealed that deep learning is susceptible to backdoor poisoning attacks. An adversary can embed a hidden backdoor into a model to manipulate its predictions by only modifying a few training data, without controlling the…
There is a common belief that humans and many animals follow transitive inference (choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C). Transitivity seems to be the essence of rational choice. We…
There are multiple notions of coalitional responsibility. The focus of this paper is on the blameworthiness defined through the principle of alternative possibilities: a coalition is blamable for a statement if the statement is true, but…
An approach towards quantum games is proposed that uses the unusual probabilities involved in EPR-type experiments directly in two-player games.
Poker is a challenging problem for artificial intelligence, with non-deterministic dynamics, partial observability, and the added difficulty of unknown adversaries. Modelling all of the uncertainties in this domain is not an easy task. In…