Related papers: Heckler: Breaking Confidential VMs with Malicious …
Customers of cloud services have to trust the cloud providers, as they control the building blocks that form the cloud. This includes the hypervisor enabling the sharing of a single hardware platform among multiple tenants. AMD Secure…
Cloud computing is a ubiquitous solution to handle today's complex computing demands. However, it comes with data privacy concerns, as the cloud service provider has complete access to code and data running on their infrastructure. VM-based…
To ensure secure and trustworthy execution of applications, vendors frequently embed trusted execution environments into their systems. Here, applications are protected from adversaries, including a malicious operating system. TEEs are…
The Virtual Machine (VM)-based Trusted-Execution-Environment (TEE) technology, like AMD Secure-Encrypted-Virtualization (SEV), enables the establishment of Confidential VMs (CVMs) to protect data privacy. But CVM lacks ways to provide the…
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on converged Cloud and High-Performance Computing (HPC) infrastructure. However, as LLMs handle confidential inputs and are fine-tuned on costly, proprietary datasets, their heightened…
Scientific computing sometimes involves computation on sensitive data. Depending on the data and the execution environment, the HPC (high-performance computing) user or data provider may require confidentiality and/or integrity guarantees.…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are an integral part of modern secure processors. They ensure that their application and code pages are confidential, tamper proof and immune to diverse types of attacks. In 2021, Intel suddenly…
Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are becoming increasingly prevalent in cloud computing, forming the basis for confidential computing. However, the security goals of TEEs sometimes conflict with existing cloud…
Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) provide isolation guarantees for data in use, but their threat model does not include physical level protection and side-channel attacks. Therefore, current deployments rely on trusted cloud providers to…
Modern processors can offer hardware primitives that allow a process to run in isolation. These primitives implement a trusted execution environment (TEE) in which a program can run such that the integrity and confidentiality of its…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been proposed as a solution to protect code confidentiality in scenarios where computation is outsourced to an untrusted operator. We study the resilience of such solutions to side-channel attacks…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow user processes to create enclaves that protect security-sensitive computation against access from the OS kernel and the hypervisor. Recent work has shown that TEEs are vulnerable to side-channel…
Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is a new architectural extension in the 4th Generation Intel Xeon Scalable Processor that supports confidential computing. TDX allows the deployment of virtual machines in the Secure-Arbitration Mode…
The ever increasing popularity and availability of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) had a stark influence on microarchitectural attack research in academia, as their strong attacker model both boosts existing attack vectors and…
Confidential computing is a security paradigm that enables the protection of confidential code and data in a co-tenanted cloud deployment using specialized hardware isolation units called Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). By…
Protection of data-in-use is a key priority, for which Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) technology has unarguably emerged as a, possibly the most, promising solution. Multiple server-side TEE offerings have been released over the years,…
With the increasing deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) on mobile and edge platforms, securing them against model extraction attacks has become a pressing concern. However, protecting model privacy without sacrificing the performance…
Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) are increasingly adopted to protect sensitive workloads from privileged adversaries such as the hypervisor. While they provide strong isolation guarantees, existing CVM architectures lack first-class…
This paper shows how an attacker can break the confidentiality of a hardware enclave with Membuster, an off-chip attack based on snooping the memory bus. An attacker with physical access can observe an unencrypted address bus and extract…
Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) based on trusted execution environments (TEEs) enable new privacy-preserving solutions. Yet, they leave side-channel leakage outside their threat model, shifting the responsibility of mitigating such…