Related papers: Chasing Contests
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
The problem of consensus in the presence of adversarially behaving agents has been studied extensively in the literature. The proposed algorithms typically guarantee that the consensus value lies within the convex hull of initial normal…
We study how to incentivize agents in a target group to produce a higher output in the context of incomplete information, by means of rank-order allocation contests. We describe a symmetric Bayes--Nash equilibrium for contests that have two…
We study the problem of computing correlated strategies to commit to in games with multiple leaders and followers. To the best of our knowledge, this problem is widely unexplored so far, as the majority of the works in the literature focus…
Within the framework of Game Theory, contests study decision-making in those situations or conflicts when rewards depend on the relative rank between contenders rather than their absolute performance. By relying on the formalism of Tullock…
When people pursue rewards in stochastic environments, they often match their choice frequencies to the observed target frequencies, even when this policy is demonstrably sub-optimal. We used a ``hide and seek'' task to evaluate this…
Interpretability research aims to bridge the gap between empirical success and our scientific understanding of the inner workings of large language models (LLMs). However, most existing research focuses on analyzing a single mechanism, such…
Public debates are a common platform for presenting and juxtaposing diverging views on important issues. In this work we propose a methodology for tracking how ideas flow between participants throughout a debate. We use this approach in a…
Standard selective prediction methods typically estimate uncertainty from the output of a single predictive branch. While effective for general uncertainty estimation, these approaches often struggle under partial observability, where local…
This paper investigates a pursuit-evasion problem involving three agents: a pursuer, an evader, and a defender. Cooperative guidance laws are developed for the evader-defender team that guarantee interception of the pursuer by the defender…
We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…
Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient,…
Dynamic benchmarks interweave model fitting and data collection in an attempt to mitigate the limitations of static benchmarks. In contrast to an extensive theoretical and empirical study of the static setting, the dynamic counterpart lags…
We study the competition of two spreading entities, for example innovations, in complex contagion processes in complex networks. We develop an analytical framework and examine the role of dual users, i.e. agents using both technologies.…
Progress in science and technology is punctuated by disruptive innovation and breakthroughs. Researchers have characterized these disruptions to explore the factors that spark such innovations and to assess their long-term trends. However,…
We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…
We study the design of optimal incentives in sequential processes. To do so, we consider a basic and fundamental model in which an agent initiates a value-creating sequential process through costly investment with random success. If…
We study a two-player model of conflict with multiple battlefields -- the novel element is that each of the players has their own network of spillovers so that resources allocated to one battle can be utilized in winning neighboring…
Consider a two-person zero-sum search game between a hider and a searcher. The hider hides among $n$ discrete locations, and the searcher successively visits individual locations until finding the hider. Known to both players, a search at…
We present a general theoretical model for the spatio-temporal dynamics of animal contests. Inspired by interactions between physical particles, the model is formulated in terms of effective interaction potentials, which map typical…