Related papers: Chasing Contests
I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer chooses at which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants. I provide results for a wide range of possible objectives for the contest…
We study a model of dynamic two-stage R&D competition where the competing firms are uncertain about the difficulty of the first stage. Staying in the competition is costly and a firm can also choose whether and when to quit. When a firm…
In some athletic races, such as cycling and types of speed skating races, athletes have to complete a relatively long distance at a high speed in the presence of direct opponents. To win such a race, athletes are motivated to hide behind…
This paper investigates a two-stage game-theoretical model with multiple parallel rank-order contests. In this model, each contest designer sets up a contest and determines the prize structure within a fixed budget in the first stage.…
The pursuit-evasion game is studied for two adversarial active agents, modelled as a deterministic self-steering pursuer and a stochastic, cognitive evader. The pursuer chases the evader by reorienting its propulsion direction with limited…
We investigate the model of multiple contests held in parallel, where each contestant selects one contest to join and each contest designer decides the prize structure to compete for the participation of contestants. We first analyze the…
This paper introduces a contest-theoretic simplified model of triathlon as a sequential two-stage game. In Stage 1 (post-swim), participants decide whether to continue or withdraw from the contest, thereby generating an endogenous…
We study a tractable two-player contest built on a truncated cubic contest success function. Its defining feature is a strategic-feedback parameter whose sign determines whether a leading player's effort lowers (suppression) or raises…
This paper studies a pursuit-evasion problem involving a single pursuer and a single evader, where we are interested in developing a pursuit strategy that doesn't require continuous, or even periodic, information about the position of the…
We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an…
I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of…
We consider a class of pursuit-evasion differential games in which the evader has continuous access to the pursuer's location, but not vice-versa. There is an immobile sensor (e.g., a ground radar station) that can sense the evader's…
We study a pursuit-evasion game between a double integrator-driven pursuer with bounded velocity and bounded acceleration and a single integrator-driven evader with bounded velocity in a two-dimensional plane. The pursuer's goal is to…
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure…
How can one efficiently share payoffs with collaborators when participating in risky research? First, I show that efficiency can be achieved by allocating payoffs asymmetrically between the researcher who makes a breakthrough ("winner") and…
We propose a decentralized solution for a pursuit-evasion game involving a heterogeneous group of rational (selfish) pursuers and a single evader based on the framework of potential games. In the proposed game, the evader aims to delay (or,…
In order to describe the velocity and the anaerobic energy of two runners competing against each other for middle-distance races, we present a mathematical model relying on an optimal control problem for a system of ordinary differential…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
We study experimentally contests in which players make investment decisions sequentially, and information on prior investments is revealed between stages. Using a between-subject design, we consider all possible sequences in contests of…
I study symmetric competitions in which each player chooses an arbitrary distribution over a one-dimensional performance index, subject to a convex cost. I establish existence of a symmetric equilibrium, document various properties it must…