Related papers: Imitation dynamics and the replicator equation
In this work we propose a kinetic formulation for evolutionary game theory for zero sum games when the agents use mixed strategies. We start with a simple adaptive rule, where after an encounter each agent increases the probability of play…
The problem of multi-agent learning and adaptation has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years. It has been suggested that the dynamics of multi agent learning can be studied using replicator equations from population biology.…
We consider a model of cultural evolution for a strategy selection in a population of individuals who interact in a game theoretic framework. The evolution combines individual learning of the environment (population strategy profile),…
We consider a dual model of decision making, in which an individual forms its opinion based on contrasting mechanisms of imitation and rational calculation. The decision making model (DMM) implements imitating behavior by means of a network…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally…
We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and…
The literature on evolutionary game theory suggests that pure strategies that are strictly dominated by other pure strategies always become extinct under imitative game dynamics, but they can survive under innovative dynamics. As we…
According to the standard imitation protocol, a less successful player adopts the strategy of the more successful one faithfully for future success. This is the cornerstone of evolutionary game theory that explores the vitality of competing…
How cooperation can evolve between players is an unsolved problem of biology. Here we use Hamiltonian dynamics of models of the Ising type to describe populations of cooperating and defecting players to show that the equilibrium fraction of…
From a self-centered perspective, it can be assumed that people only hold opinions that can benefit them. If opinions have no intrinsic value, and acquire their value when held by the majority of individuals in a discussion group, then we…
Uncertainty, characterised by randomness and stochasticity, is ubiquitous in applications of evolutionary game theory across various fields, including biology, economics and social sciences. The uncertainty may arise from various sources…
We conducted a laboratory experiment involving human subjects to test the theoretical hypothesis that equilibrium selection can be impacted by manipulating the games dynamics process, by using modern control theory. Our findings indicate…
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. Reproduction depends on the payoff a strategy receives. The payoff depends on the environment that may change over time, on intrinsic uncertainties, and on other sources of…
In Evolutionary game theory the payoffs are typically fixed or shaped by external environmental variables. Here, we introduce an endogenous-feedback model in which the game played coevolves directly with the population state: the payoff…
Applying the concepts and formalisms from Evolutionary Game Theory to the data regime, the fundamental paradigms of Evolutionary Data Theory are introduced. Interpreting data in matrix form as evolutionary entities, input data is mapped to…
Frequency dependent selection and demographic fluctuations play important roles in evolutionary and ecological processes. Under frequency dependent selection, the average fitness of the population may increase or decrease based on…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
The emergence and prevalence of cooperative behavior within a group of selfish individuals remains a puzzle for \text{evolutionary game theory} precisely because it conflicts directly with the central idea of natural selection. Accordingly,…
Game theory ideas provide a useful framework for studying evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed environment. This approach, however, typically enforces a strictly fixed overall population size, deemphasizing natural growth processes. We…