Related papers: Imitation dynamics and the replicator equation
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…
In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying evolutionary games with environmental feedback. Previous studies exclusively focus on two-player games. However, extension to multi-player game is needed to study problems such as…
Reputation plays a crucial role in social interactions by affecting the fitness of individuals during an evolutionary process. Previous works have extensively studied the result of imitation dynamics without focusing on potential irrational…
We introduce a mathematical model that combines the concepts of complex contagion with payoff-biased imitation, to describe how social behaviors spread through a population. Traditional models of social learning by imitation are based on…
The game dynamical equations are derived from Boltzmann-like equations for individual pair interactions by assuming a certain kind of imitation behavior, the so-called proportional imitation rule. They can be extended to a stochastic…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations…
Evolutionary game theory offers a general framework to study how behaviors evolve by social learning in a population. This body of theory can accommodate a range of social dilemmas, or games, as well as real-world complexities such as…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
This brief discusses evolutionary game theory as a powerful and unified mathematical tool to study evolution of collective behaviours. It summarises some of my recent research directions using evolutionary game theory methods, which include…
In this letter, we deal with evolutionary game theoretic learning processes for population games on networks with dynamically evolving communities. Specifically, we propose a novel mathematical framework in which a deterministic,…
We propose a simple model of network co-evolution in a game-dynamical system of interacting agents that play repeated games with their neighbors, and adapt their behaviors and network links based on the outcome of those games. The…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…
Eco-evolutionary dynamics is crucial to understand how individuals' behaviors and the surrounding environment interplay with each other. Typically, it is assumed that individuals update their behaviors via linear imitation function, i.e.,…
Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…
In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…
People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…