Related papers: Winning Without Observing Payoffs: Exploiting Beha…

We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an…

We investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game with asymmetric information on the payoff and without Isaacs condition. The dynamics is an ordinary differential equation parametrised by two controls chosen by the players. Each player…

We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…

n infinite two-player zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored eventually but not necessarily immediately after they are played, is determined. The proof relies on a representation of the game as…

We revisit the well-studied problem of designing fair and manipulation-resistant tournament rules. In this problem, we seek a mechanism that (probabilistically) identifies the winner of a tournament after observing round-robin play among…

We introduce Bayesimax theory, a paradigm for objective Bayesian analysis which selects priors by applying minimax theory to prior disclosure games. In these games, the uniquely optimal strategy for a Bayesian agent upon observing the data…

We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely…

We study the reward-free reinforcement learning framework, which is particularly suitable for batch reinforcement learning and scenarios where one needs policies for multiple reward functions. This framework has two phases. In the…

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a…

We study the optimal allocation of prizes in rank-order tournaments with loss averse agents. Prize sharing becomes increasingly optimal with loss aversion because more equitable prizes reduce the marginal psychological cost of anticipated…

Matrix games constitute a fundamental problem of game theory and describe a situation of two players with completely conflicting interests. We show how methods from statistical mechanics can be used to investigate the statistical properties…

We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…

This work considers two-player zero-sum semi-Markov games with incomplete information on one side and perfect observation. At the beginning, the system selects a game type according to a given probability distribution and informs to Player…

In this paper, we investigate the existence of online learning algorithms with bandit feedback that simultaneously guarantee $O(1)$ regret compared to a given comparator strategy, and $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret compared to any fixed…

We consider a sequential learning problem with Gaussian payoffs and side information: after selecting an action $i$, the learner receives information about the payoff of every action $j$ in the form of Gaussian observations whose mean is…

Each of two players, by turns, rolls a dice several times accumulating the successive scores until he decides to stop, or he rolls an ace. When stopping, the accumulated turn score is added to the player account and the dice is given to his…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

We study two-player zero-sum stochastic games, and propose a form of independent learning dynamics called Doubly Smoothed Best-Response dynamics, which integrates a discrete and doubly smoothed variant of the best-response dynamics into…

Faced with data-driven policies, individuals will manipulate their features to obtain favorable decisions. While earlier works cast these manipulations as undesirable gaming, recent works have adopted a more nuanced causal framing in which…

We study two-player reachability games on finite graphs. At each state the interaction between the players is concurrent and there is a stochastic Nature. Players also play stochastically. The literature tells us that 1) Player B, who wants…