Related papers: Stealthy Deactivation of Safety Filters
Safety filters ensure that control actions that are executed are always safe, no matter the controller in question. Previous work has proposed a simple and stealthy false-data injection attack for deactivating such safety filters. This…
This paper presents a secure safety filter design for nonlinear systems under sensor spoofing attacks. Existing approaches primarily focus on linear systems which limits their applications in real-world scenarios. In this work, we extend…
We study how to secure distributed filters for linear time-invariant systems with bounded noise under false-data injection attacks. A malicious attacker is able to arbitrarily manipulate the observations for a time-varying and unknown…
Modern autopilot systems are prone to sensor attacks that can jeopardize flight safety. To mitigate this risk, we proposed a modular solution: the secure safety filter, which extends the well-established control barrier function (CBF)-based…
Nowadays, many control systems are networked and embed communication and computation capabilities. Such control architectures are prone to cyber attacks on the cyberinfrastructure. Consequently, there is an impellent need to develop…
In this paper, we propose an effective and easily deployable approach to detect the presence of stealthy sensor attacks in industrial control systems, where (legacy) control devices critically rely on accurate (and usually non-encrypted)…
This paper investigates the vulnerability of discrete-time linear time-invariant systems to stealthy sensor attacks during the learning phase. In particular, we demonstrate that a {data-driven} adversary, without access to the system model,…
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…
In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy false data injection attacks on sensors. We start by defining the stealthiness notion in the most general form where an attack is…
This paper considers the problem of detector tuning against false data injection attacks. In particular, we consider an adversary injecting false sensor data to maximize the state deviation of the plant, referred to as impact, whilst being…
This paper considers a method of coding the sensor outputs in order to detect stealthy false data injection attacks. An intelligent attacker can design a sequence of data injection to sensors and actuators that pass the state estimator and…
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…
In this work, we evaluate theoretical results on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup. We demonstrate that for a controller with stable dynamics the…
We study the problem of designing false measurement data that is injected to corrupt and mislead the output of a Kalman filter. Unlike existing works that focus on detection and filtering algorithms for the observer, we study the problem…
We study the problem of designing false measurement data that is injected to corrupt and mislead the output of a Kalman filter. Unlike existing works that focus on detection and filtering algorithms for the observer, we study the problem…
Industrial control systems (ICS), which in many cases are components of critical national infrastructure, are increasingly being connected to other networks and the wider internet motivated by factors such as enhanced operational…
Implementation of learning-based control remains challenging due to the absence of safety guarantees. Safe control methods have turned to model-based safety filters to address these challenges, but this is paradoxical when the ultimate goal…
We address the problem of attack detection and isolation for a class of discrete-time nonlinear systems under (potentially unbounded) sensor attacks and measurement noise. We consider the case when a subset of sensors is subject to additive…
The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional anomaly detection techniques used in the energy system state estimators. In this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be constructed blindly, i.e., without…
Cyber-physical systems can be subject to sensor attacks, e.g., sensor spoofing, leading to unsafe behaviors. This paper addresses this problem in the context of linear systems when an omniscient attacker can spoof several system sensors at…