Related papers: An $\alpha$-potential game framework for $N$-playe…
The $N$-player quantum game is analyzed in the context of an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment. In this setting, a player's strategies are not unitary transformations as in alternate quantum game-theoretic frameworks, but a classical…
Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…
This paper presents a learning dynamic with almost sure convergence guarantee for any stochastic game with turn-based controllers (on state transitions) as long as stage-payoffs induce a zero-sum or identical-interest game. Stage-payoffs…
We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…
We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…
We study Nash equilibrium learning in partially observable Markov games (POMGs), a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework in which agents cannot fully observe the underlying state. Prior work in this setting relies on centralization…
In decision-dependent games, multiple players optimize their decisions under a data distribution that shifts with their joint actions, creating complex dynamics in applications like market pricing. A practical consequence of these dynamics…
The paper studies properties of functional dependencies between strategies of players in Nash equilibria of multi-player strategic games. The main focus is on the properties of functional dependencies in the context of a fixed dependency…
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…
We study how strategic interaction can arise from controlled quantum dynamics rather than being imposed as an external mathematical structure. We introduce a class of interaction-defined quantum games in which players are represented by…
We study a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game where one player controls the state variable via additive impulses while the other player can stop the game at any time. The main goal of this work is characterize Nash…
We introduce a new approach to the study of influence in strategic settings where the action of an individual depends on that of others in a network-structured way. We propose \emph{influence games} as a \emph{game-theoretic} model of the…
We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash…
We investigate the effects of update rules on the dynamics of an evolutionary game-theoretic model - the N-player evolutionary trust game - consisting of three types of players: investors, trustworthy trustees, and untrustworthy trustees.…
We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…
We introduce a framework for stochastic games on large sparse graphs, covering continuous-time and discrete-time dynamic games as well as static games. Players are indexed by the vertices of simple, locally finite graphs, allowing both…
We are interested in the study of stochastic games for which each player faces an optimal stopping problem. In our setting, the players may interact through the criterion to optimise as well as through their dynamics. After briefly…
The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…
Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…
This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are…