Related papers: An $\alpha$-potential game framework for $N$-playe…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
We study mean field games and corresponding $N$-player games in continuous time over a finite time horizon where the position of each agent belongs to a finite state space. As opposed to previous works on finite state mean field games, we…
In this paper, we examine a class of $\alpha$-potential stochastic differential games with random coefficients via the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) approach. Specifically, we show that the first and second order linear…
This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…
In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…
In this paper, we study a class of two-player deterministic finite-horizon difference games with coupled inequality constraints, where each player has two types of decision variables: one involving sequential interactions and the other…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…
In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…
We study a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, namely, stochastic games with independent chains and unknown transition matrices. In this class of games, players control their own internal Markov chains whose transitions do not depend…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…
We consider an N-player hierarchical game in which the i-th player's objective comprises of an expectation-valued term, parametrized by rival decisions, and a hierarchical term. Such a framework allows for capturing a broad range of…
We consider stochastic differential games with a large number of players, with the aim of quantifying the gap between closed-loop, open-loop and distributed equilibria. We show that, under two different semi-monotonicity conditions, the…
We establish the existence and uniqueness of distributed equilibria to possibly nonsymmetric $N$ player differential games with interactions through controls under displacement semimonotonicity assumptions. Surprisingly, the nonseparable…
In this paper, a Nash-type fictitious game framework is introduced to handle a time-inconsistent linear-quadratic optimal control. The Nash-type game in this framework is called fictitious as it is between the decision maker (called real…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
We consider a symmetric $n$-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with controlled jumps and mean-field type interaction among the players. Each player minimizes some expected cost by affecting the drift as well as the jump part of…
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…
Mean field games are concerned with the limit of large-population stochastic differential games where the agents interact through their empirical distribution. In the classical setting, the number of players is large but fixed throughout…
Conventional game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational. In a realistic situation, however, players are rarely perfectly rational. This bounded rationality is one of the main reasons why the predictions of Nash equilibrium in…