Related papers: Strategic Network Creation for Enabling Greedy Rou…
We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…
We study {\sc greedy} routing over $n$ nodes placed in a ring, with the \emph{distance} between two nodes defined to be the clockwise or the absolute distance between them along the ring. Such graphs arise in the context of modeling social…
This paper studies the existence of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games, which are a general class of strategic games used to succinctly represent the players' private costs. There is a finite set of resources and the strategy set…
Many networks are used to transfer information or goods, in other words, they are navigated. The larger the network, the more difficult it is to navigate efficiently. Indeed, information routing in the Internet faces serious scalability…
We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in…
Network games provide a framework to study strategic decision making processes that are governed by structured interdependencies among agents. However, existing models do not account for environments in which agents simultaneously interact…
We consider network aggregative games to model and study multi-agent populations in which each rational agent is influenced by the aggregate behavior of its neighbors, as specified by an underlying network. Specifically, we examine systems…
Geographic routing is a routing paradigm, which uses geographic coordinates of network nodes to determine routes. Greedy routing, the simplest form of geographic routing forwards a packet to the closest neighbor towards the destination. A…
We present a fully-distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. The proposed scheme endows each agent with a gradient-based scheme equipped with a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the…
We study network connection games where the nodes of a network perform edge swaps in order to improve their communication costs. For the model proposed by Alon et al. (2010), in which the selfish cost of a node is the sum of all shortest…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
Collective communications are ubiquitous in parallel applications. We present two new algorithms for performing a reduction. The operation associated with our reduction needs to be associative and commutative. The two algorithms are…
We model a system of networking agents that seek to optimize their centrality in the network while keeping their cost, the number of connections they are participating in, low. Unlike other game-theory based models for network evolution,…
We study a network formation game where $n$ players, identified with the nodes of a directed graph to be formed, choose where to wire their outgoing links in order to maximize their PageRank centrality. Specifically, the action of every…
We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality by increasing the number of other players to which they are path-wise connected, while simultaneously incurring a cost for each added…
Multi-agent decision problems are typically solved via distributed iterative algorithms, where the agents only communicate between themselves on a peer-to-peer network. Each agent usually maintains a copy of each decision variable, while…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…
For compressed sensing over arbitrarily connected networks, we consider the problem of estimating underlying sparse signals in a distributed manner. We introduce a new signal model that helps to describe inter-signal correlation among…