Related papers: Robust Communication Between Parties with Nearly I…

A principal and $n\ge 2$ agents can launch a project if the principal proposes it and at least $k$ agents accept. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an ex ante unknown state. The principal can conduct a test to learn about…

This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests…

We consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver whose utility may be nonlinear in her belief; we call such receivers risk-conscious. Such utility models arise when the receiver exhibits systematic biases away from…

Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information revelation --- often described as a signaling scheme --- in order to yield the most desirable equilibrium outcome. Recently, there has been a large…

Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the…

In this paper we investigate the potential for persuasion arising from the quantum indeterminacy of a decision-maker's beliefs, a feature that has been proposed as a formal expression of well-known cognitive limitations. We focus on a…

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on…

We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq…

In the persuasion model, apart from a few special cases, comparative statics has been an open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal. Our first…

A sender seeks to persuade a receiver by presenting evidence obtained through a sequence of private experiments. The sender has complete flexibility in his choice of experiments, contingent on the private experimentation history. The sender…

Strategic communication often relies on anchors observed by the sender but not by the receiver. An analyst may report against a proprietary valuation model, an auditor against an internal score, a manager against an accounting estimate, or…

We study the robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) for a class of games in communications systems and networks where the impact of users on each other is an additive function of their strategies. Each user measures this impact, which may be…

We study public persuasion when a sender communicates with a large audience that can fact-check at heterogeneous costs. The sender commits to a public information policy before the state is realized, but any verifiable claim she makes after…

We study discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks. These games model the interplay between a player's private belief and his/her publicly stated opinion (which could be different from the player's belief) as a strategic…

In recent years, agents have become capable of communicating seamlessly via natural language and navigating in environments that involve cooperation and competition, a fact that can introduce social dilemmas. Due to the interleaving of…

This paper analyzes a cheap-talk model with multiple senders and one receiver. Each sender observes a noisy signal about an unknown state and sends a message; the receiver observes the message tally and chooses a policy. This setting shares…

Many classical social preference (multiwinner social choice) correspondences are resolute only when two alternatives and an odd number of individuals are considered. Thus, they generally admit several resolute refinements, each of them…

This paper proposes the notion of robust PBE in a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. It identifies the utility…

I study dynamic contracting where Sender privately observes a Markovian state and seeks to motivate Receiver, who acts. Sender provides incentives in two ways: payments, which alter payoffs ex-post, and (Bayesian) persuasion, which shapes…

The literature in modern machine learning has only negative results for learning to communicate between competitive agents using standard RL. We introduce a modified sender-receiver game to study the spectrum of partially-competitive…