Related papers: When is Trust Robust?
The scale and terms of aggregate borrowing in an economy depend on the manner in which wealth is distributed across potential creditors with heterogeneous beliefs about the future. This distribution evolves over time as uncertainty is…
Cooperative behaviors are ubiquitous in nature,which is a puzzle to evolutionary biology,because the defector always gains more benefit than the cooperator,thus,the cooperator should decrease and vanish over time.This typical "prisoners'…
Cooperation between individuals is emergent in all parts of society, yet mechanistic reasons for this emergence is ill understood in the literature. A specific example of this is insurance. Recent work has, though, shown that assuming the…
An increasingly common socio-technical problem is people being taken in by offers that sound ``too good to be true'', where persuasion and trust shape decision-making. This paper investigates how \abr{ai} can help detect these deceptive…
Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incentive compatible. We find that if each side has a…
With recent development of artificial intelligence, it is more common to adopt AI agents in economic activities. This paper explores the economic actions of agents, including human agents and AI agents, in an economic game of trading…
An employer contracts with a worker to incentivize efforts whose productivity depends on ability; the worker then enters a market that pays him contingent on ability evaluation. With non-additive monitoring technology, the interdependence…
When a population is engaged in successive prisoner's dilemmas, indirect reciprocity through reputation fosters cooperation through the emergence of moral and action rules. A simplified model has recently been proposed where individuals…
We propose a simple model that describes the dynamics of efficiencies of competing agents. Agents communicate leading to increase of efficiencies of underachievers, and an efficiency of each agent can increase or decrease irrespectively of…
Using the similar formulas of the preference relation and the utility function, we propose the confidence relations and the corresponding influence functions that represent various interacting strengths of different families, cliques and…
Various formulations of counterfactual general equilibrium in economies -- systems of actors manipulating economic goods -- are logically and mathematically analyzed. Evenly-rotating economies are systems whose evolution is stable, steady,…
Gossip has been shown to be a relatively efficient solution to problems of cooperation in reputation-based systems of exchange, but many studies don't conceptualize gossiping in a realistic way, often assuming near-perfect information or…
A principal continually decides whether to approve resource allocations to an agent, who exerts private effort to remain eligible. The principal must perform costly inspections to determine the agent's eligibility. We characterize Markov…
This paper studies multilateral matching in which agents may negotiate contracts within any coalition. We assume scale economies such that an agent substitutes some existing contracts with new ones only if the latter involve a set of…
Robustness is often regarded as a critical future challenge for real-world applications, where stability is essential. However, as models often learn tasks in a similar order, we hypothesize that easier tasks will be easier regardless of…
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and…
Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest…
An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect…
This work considers the problem of resilient consensus where stochastic values of trust between agents are available. Specifically, we derive a unified mathematical framework to characterize convergence, deviation of the consensus from the…
We investigate an agent-based model for the emergence of corruption in public contracts. There are two types of agents: business people and public servants. Both business people and public servants can adopt two strategies: corrupt or…