Related papers: Controlling Delegations in Liquid Democracy

We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…

The Coalitional Manipulation problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. However, most studies have focused on the complete information setting, wherein the manipulators know the votes of the…

In the field of access control, delegation is an important aspect that is considered as a part of the administration mechanism. Thus, a complete access control must provide a flexible administration model to manage delegation.…

In the context of humans operating with artificial or autonomous agents in a hybrid team, it is essential to accurately identify when to authorize those team members to perform actions. Given past examples where humans and autonomous…

Elections are the central institution of democratic processes, and often the elected body -- in either public or private governance -- is a committee of individuals. To ensure the legitimacy of elected bodies, the electoral processes should…

It is important to understand how the outcome of an election can be modified by an agent with control over the structure of the election. Electoral control has been studied for many election systems, but for all studied systems the winner…

In this paper we discuss the problems of modern representative democracy and we look at the selection of legislators by lot as a way to tame some of the drawbacks of that system. It is recalled at the beginning that resorting to sortition…

We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian, single winner election systems. The system lets people vote for multiple parties, but then assigns each…

Decision procedures aggregating the preferences of multiple agents can produce cycles and hence outcomes which have been described heuristically as `chaotic'. We make this description precise by constructing an explicit dynamical system…

We consider binary group decision-making under a rich model of liquid democracy recently proposed by Colley, Grandi, and Novaro (2022): agents submit ranked delegation options, where each option may be a function of multiple agents' votes;…

We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by several clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to c that each voter simply replaces c in his vote…

Voting is a simple mechanism to combine together the preferences of multiple agents. Agents may try to manipulate the result of voting by mis-reporting their preferences. One barrier that might exist to such manipulation is computational…

Much research in electoral control -- one of the most studied form of electoral attacks, in which an entity running an election alters the structure of that election to yield a preferred outcome -- has focused on giving decision complexity…

The computational study of elections generally assumes that the preferences of the electorate come in as a list of votes. Depending on the context, it may be much more natural to represent the list succinctly, as the distinct votes of the…

The bribery problem in election has received considerable attention in the literature, upon which various algorithmic and complexity results have been obtained. It is thus natural to ask whether we can protect an election from potential…

We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…

We study the complexity of influencing elections through bribery: How computationally complex is it for an external actor to determine whether by a certain amount of bribing voters a specified candidate can be made the election's winner? We…

A negotiating team is a group of two or more agents who join together as a single negotiating party because they share a common goal related to the negotiation. Since a negotiating team is composed of several stakeholders, represented as a…

We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping…

In this paper, we investigate the so-called ODP-problem that has been formulated by Caragiannis and Micha [10]. Here, we are in a setting with two election alternatives out of which one is assumed to be correct. In ODP, the goal is to…