Related papers: Partner selection and evolution of out-group avoid…
Understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology and is frequently studied by the framework of evolutionary game theory. A very powerful mechanism to promote cooperation is…
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
Various theoretical and empirical studies have accounted for why humans cooperate in competitive environments. Although prior work has revealed that network structure and multiplex interactions can promote cooperation, most theory assumes…
In social dilemmas self-interested learning agents face the choice between the societal benefit of cooperation and the immediate reward of defection. Significant evidence exists on the benefits of assortment mechanisms such as partner…
We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…
The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a…
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…
Cooperation is usually represented as a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although individual self-interest may not favour cooperation, cooperation can evolve if, for example, players interact multiple times adjusting their behaviour accordingly to…
We seek a route to the equilibrium where all the agents cooperate in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game on a two-dimensional plane, focusing on the role of tit-for-tat strategy. When a time horizon, within which a strategy can recall the…
As autonomous agents become more prevalent, understanding their collective behaviour in strategic interactions is crucial. This study investigates the emergent cooperative tendencies of systems of Large Language Model (LLM) agents in a…
We present a collaboration ring model -- a network of players playing the prisoner's dilemma game and collaborating among the nearest neighbours by forming coalitions. The microscopic stochastic updating of the players' strategies are…
Commitment is a well-established mechanism for fostering cooperation in human society and multi-agent systems. However, existing research has predominantly focused on the commitment that neglects the freedom of players to abstain from an…
The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) deals with the cooperation/defection conflict between two agents. The agents are represented by a cell of $L \times L$ square lattice. The agents are initially randomly distributed according to a certain…
Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…
The evolution and long-term sustenance of cooperation has consistently piqued scholarly interest across the disciplines of evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous theoretical and experimental studies on collective risk social…
Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [Muchnik, \emph{et al.}, Sci. Rep. \textbf{3}, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in…
As humans perceive and actively engage with the world, we adjust our decisions in response to shifting group dynamics and are influenced by social interactions. This study aims to identify which aspects of interaction affect…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked…