Related papers: When selection pays: structured public goods game …
Enforcing cooperation among substantial agents is one of the main objectives for multi-agent systems. However, due to the existence of inherent social dilemmas in many scenarios, the free-rider problem may arise during agents' long-run…
In this study, we explore the potential of Game Theory as a means to investigate cooperation and trust in human-robot mixed groups. Particularly, we introduce the Public Good Game (PGG), a model highlighting the tension between individual…
Evolutionary game theory assumes that individuals maximize their benefits when choosing strategies. However, an alternative perspective proposes that individuals seek to maximize the benefits of others. To explore the relationship between…
In the context of Evolutionary Game Theory, one of the most noteworthy mechanisms to support cooperation is spatial reciprocity, usually accomplished by distributing players in a spatial structure allowing cooperators to cluster together…
Addressing the question of how to achieve optimal decision-making under risk and uncertainty is crucial for enhancing the capabilities of artificial agents that collaborate with or support humans. In this work, we address this question in…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the…
We introduce a framework for studying social dilemmas in networked societies where individuals follow a simple state-based behavioral mechanism based on generalized reciprocity, which is rooted in the principle "help anyone if helped by…
According to the public goods game (PGG) protocol, participants decide freely whether they want to contribute to a common pool or not, but the resulting benefit is distributed equally. A conceptually similar dilemma situation may emerge…
We propose an extended public goods interaction model to study the evolution of cooperation in heterogeneous population. The investors are arranged on the well known scale-free type network, the Barab\'{a}si-Albert model. Each investor is…
The problem of free-riding arises when individuals benefit from a shared resource, service, or public good without contributing proportionately to its provision. This conduct often leads to a collective action problem, as individuals pursue…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
Understanding the emergence of cooperation is a central issue in evolutionary game theory. The hardest setup for the attainment of cooperation in a population of individuals is the Public Goods game in which cooperative agents generate a…
We study the evolution of cooperation in populations where individuals play prisoner's dilemma on a network. Every node of the network corresponds on an individual choosing whether to cooperate or defect in a repeated game. The players…
Motion is a typical reaction among animals and humans trying to reach better conditions in a changing world. This aspect has been studied intensively in social dilemmas where competing players' individual and collective interests are in…
In this paper we address the cooperation problem in structured populations by considering the prisoner's dilemma game as metaphor of the social interactions between individuals with imitation capacity. We present a new strategy update rule…
Cooperation in heterogeneous groups, where individuals differ in resources, productivity, and behavioural responsiveness, underpins collective action across many social and biological systems. Introspection dynamics, in which each player…
Finding ways to overcome the temptation to exploit one another is still a challenge in behavioural sciences. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, punishing strategies are frequently used to promote cooperation in competitive…
Stabilizing cooperation among self-interested individuals presents a fundamental challenge in evolutionary theory and social science. While classical models predict the dominance of defection in social dilemmas, empirical and theoretical…
It is a challenging task to reach global cooperation among self-interested agents, which often requires sophisticated design or usage of incentives. For example, we may apply supervisors or referees who are able to detect and punish…
Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, social interaction could change the relationship of people. And the changing social structure will affect the people's strategy too. We build…