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Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
Lloyd Shapley's cooperative value allocation theory stands as a central concept in game theory, extensively utilized across various domains to distribute resources, evaluate individual contributions, and ensure fairness. The Shapley value…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
Strong reciprocity is a fundamental human characteristic associated with our extraordinary sociality and cooperation. Laboratory experiments on social dilemma games and many field studies have quantified well-defined levels of cooperation…
Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…
The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…
The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
This paper investigates the potential benefits of cooperation in scenarios where finitely many agents compete for shared resources, leading to congestion and thereby reduced rewards. By appropriate coordination the members of the…
Research in cooperative games often assumes that agents know the coalitional values with certainty, and that they can belong to one coalition only. By contrast, this work assumes that the value of a coalition is based on an underlying…
In Cooperative Games with Externalities when the members of a set S \subset N of agents wish to deviate they need to calculate their worth. This worth depends on what the non-members (outsiders) N \setminus S will do, which in turn depends…
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
Firms in inter-organizational networks such as supply chains or strategic alliances are exposed to interdependent risks. These are risks that are transferable across partner firms. They can be decomposed into intrinsic risks a firm faces…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
This paper uses category theory to develop an entirely new approach to approximate game theory. Game theory is the study of how different agents within a multi-agent system take decisions. At its core, game theory asks what an optimal…
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…
Most of the existing algorithms for fair division do not consider externalities. Under externalities, the utility an agent obtains depends not only on its allocation but also on the allocation of other agents. An agent has a positive…
In this paper we introduce a qualitative decision and game theory based on belief (B) and desire (D) rules. We show that a group of agents acts as if it is maximizing achieved joint goals.
The problem of finding the $k$ most critical nodes, referred to as the $top\text{-}k$ problem, is a very important one in several contexts such as information diffusion and preference aggregation in social networks, clustering of data…
Often times, individuals working together as a team can solve hard problems beyond the capability of any individual in the team. Cooperative optimization is a newly proposed general method for attacking hard optimization problems inspired…