Related papers: Public Projects with Preferences and Predictions
In Demand Response programs, price incentives might not be sufficient to modify residential consumers load profile. Here, we consider that each consumer has a preferred profile and a discomfort cost when deviating from it. Consumers can…
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing incentives for agents to misreport their preferences. The class of…
To determine the welfare implications of price changes in demand data, we introduce a revealed preference relation over prices. We show that the absence of cycles in this relation characterizes a consumer who trades off the utility of…
Social choice theory is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual preferences, interests, or welfare to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense. We introduce a new criterion for social choice protocols…
Crowdsourcing systems aggregate decisions of many people to help users quickly identify high-quality options, such as the best answers to questions or interesting news stories. A long-standing issue in crowdsourcing is how option quality…
We study the price of anarchy of mechanisms in the presence of risk-averse agents. Previous work has focused on agents with quasilinear utilities, possibly with a budget. Our model subsumes this as a special case but also captures that…
Facing an unknown situation, a person may not be able to firmly elicit his/her preferences over different alternatives, so he/she tends to express uncertain preferences. Given a community of different persons expressing their preferences…
Institutional crossing platforms face a hidden-information problem: investors value trades as portfolios, but liquidity discovery is typically organized around individual securities. We model portfolio crossing as limited-communication…
We provide sufficient conditions for semi-nonparametric point identification of a mixture model of decision making under risk, when agents make choices in multiple lines of insurance coverage (contexts) by purchasing a bundle. As a first…
Preferences, fundamental in all forms of strategic behavior and collective decision-making, in their raw form, are an abstract ordering on a set of alternatives. Agents, we assume, revise their preferences as they gain more information…
In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of self-interested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public planner must choose a subset of these projects, subject to a…
In societal-scale infrastructures, such as electric grids or transportation networks, pricing mechanisms are often used as a way to shape users' demand in order to lower operating costs and improve reliability. Existing approaches to…
We study a class of {\em aggregation rules} that could be applied to ethical AI decision-making. These rules yield the decisions to be made by automated systems based on the information of profiles of preferences over possible choices. We…
Many large-scale recommender systems consist of two stages. The first stage efficiently screens the complete pool of items for a small subset of promising candidates, from which the second-stage model curates the final recommendations. In…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how some fixed value should be shared among them. We are interested in settings where the share that each agent receives is based on how that agent is evaluated by other members of…
Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…
Recent studies on many-to-one matching markets have explored agents with flexible capacity and truthful preference reporting, focusing on mechanisms that jointly design capacities and select a matching. However, in real-world applications…
Organizations increasingly deploy multiple AI systems across task domains, but selecting a small, high-performing ensemble can require costly model calls, benchmark runs, and human evaluation. We study this selection problem as a…
Motivated by the recent popularity of machine learning training services, we introduce a contract design problem in which a provider sells a service that results in an outcome of uncertain quality for the buyer. The seller has a set of…
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…