Related papers: MEV Sharing with Dynamic Extraction Rates
Blockchains offer strong security gurarantees, but cannot protect users against the ordering of transactions. Players such as miners, bots and validators can reorder various transactions and reap significant profits, called the Maximal…
The detection of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in blockchain is crucial for enhancing blockchain security, as it enables the evaluation of potential consensus layer risks, the effectiveness of anti-centralization solutions, and the…
MEV attacks have been an omnipresent evil in the blockchain world, an implicit tax that uninformed users pay for using the service. The problem arises from the miners' ability to reorder and insert arbitrary transactions in the blocks they…
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) in Constant Function Market Making is fairly well understood. Does having dynamic weights, as found in liquidity boostrap pools (LBPs), Temporal-function market makers (TFMMs), and Replicating market makers…
The Ethereum blockchain utilizes the EIP-1559 algorithm to manage transaction inclusion and block assembly. However, EIP-1559 and much of the existing literature study this problem from a static perspective, focusing on price evolution…
In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions to…
The distribution of block maxima of sequences of independent and identically-distributed random variables is used to model extreme values in many disciplines. The traditional extreme value (EV) theory derives a closed-form expression for…
Autonomous Market Makers (AMMs) rely on arbitrage to facilitate passive price updates. Liquidity fragmentation poses a complex challenge across different blockchain networks. This paper proposes FluxLayer, a solution to mitigate fragmented…
In the context of blockchain, MEV refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production through the inclusion, exclusion, or reordering of transactions. Searchers often participate in order flow auctions (OFAs) to obtain…
Maximum extractable value (MEV) has been extensively studied. In most papers, the researchers have worked with the Ethereum blockchain almost exclusively. Even though, Ethereum and other blockchains have dynamic gas prices this is not the…
This paper addresses the lack of research on quantifying Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) on Ethereum Layer 2 networks (L2s). Our findings reveal a substantial amount of MEV to be extracted on L2s, particularly on Polygon, with a lower bound…
We develop a general and practical framework to address the problem of the optimal design of dynamic fee mechanisms for multiple blockchain resources. Our framework allows to compute policies that optimally trade-off between adjusting…
In the context of Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC), the task sharing mechanism among edge servers is an activity of vital importance for speeding up the computing process and thereby improve user experience. The distributed resources in…
Blockchain has empowered computer systems to be more secure using a distributed network. However, the current blockchain design suffers from fairness issues in transaction ordering. Miners are able to reorder transactions to generate…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are essential to decentralized finance, offering continuous liquidity and enabling intermediary-free trading on blockchains. However, participants in AMMs are vulnerable to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)…
We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk…
Possible manipulation of user transactions by miners in a permissionless blockchain systems is a growing concern. This problem is a pervasive and systemic issue, known as Miner Extractable Value (MEV), incurs highs costs on users of…
The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV…
Traditional single-proposer blockchains suffer from miner extractable value (MEV), where validators exploit their serial monopoly on transaction inclusion and ordering to extract rents from users. While there have been many developments at…
We study the amount of maximal extractable value (MEV) captured by validators, as a function of searcher competition, in blockchains with competitive block building markets such as Ethereum. We argue that the core is a suitable solution…