Related papers: Prime+Retouch: When Cache is Locked and Leaked
Cache side-channel attacks lead to severe security threats to the settings that a CPU is shared across users, e.g., in the cloud. The existing attacks rely on sensing the micro-architectural state changes made by victims, and this…
Flushing the cache, using instructions like clflush and wbinvd, is commonly proposed as a countermeasure against access-based cache attacks. In this report, we show that several Intel caches, specifically the L1 caches in some pre-Skylake…
Modern processors are highly optimized systems where every single cycle of computation time matters. Many optimizations depend on the data that is being processed. Software-based microarchitectural attacks exploit effects of these…
In the modern CPU architecture, enhancements such as the Line Fill Buffer (LFB) and Super Queue (SQ), which are designed to track pending cache requests, have significantly boosted performance. To exploit this structures, we deliberately…
We introduce IMPACT, a set of high-throughput main memory-based timing attacks that leverage characteristics of processing-in-memory (PiM) architectures to establish covert and side channels. IMPACT enables high-throughput communication and…
The need for secure and private Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) on edge and mobile devices has increased the necessity of protecting the architecture of these systems from threats to both security and privacy. With an…
OS-based page sharing is a commonly used optimization in modern systems to reduce memory footprint. Unfortunately, such sharing can cause Flush+Reload cache attacks, whereby a spy periodically flushes a cache line of shared data (using the…
The run-time electromagnetic (EM) emanation of microprocessors presents a side-channel that leaks the confidentiality of the applications running on them. Many recent works have demonstrated successful attacks leveraging such side-channels…
We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This…
Randomizing the mapping of addresses to cache entries has proven to be an effective technique for hardening caches against contention-based attacks like Prime+Prome. While attacks and defenses are still evolving, it is clear that randomized…
Modern microarchitectures incorporate optimization techniques such as speculative loads and store forwarding to improve the memory bottleneck. The processor executes the load speculatively before the stores, and forwards the data of a…
The increasing number of threads inside the cores of a multicore processor, and competitive access to the shared cache memory, become the main reasons for an increased number of competitive cache misses and performance decline. Inevitably,…
Lightweight cryptography is a novel diversion from conventional cryptography that targets internet-of-things (IoT) platform due to resource constraints. In comparison, it offers smaller cryptographic primitives such as shorter key sizes,…
Existing tools to detect side-channel attacks on Intel SGX are grounded on the observation that attacks affect the performance of the victim application. As such, all detection tools monitor the potential victim and raise an alarm if the…
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this…
Cache plays a critical role in reducing the performance gap between CPU and main memory. A modern multi-core CPU generally employs a multi-level hierarchy of caches, through which the most recently and frequently used data are maintained in…
Prompt caching in large language models (LLMs) results in data-dependent timing variations: cached prompts are processed faster than non-cached prompts. These timing differences introduce the risk of side-channel timing attacks. For…
The IP-stride prefetcher has recently been exploited to leak secrets through side-channel attacks. It, however, cannot be simply disabled for security with prefetching speedup as a sacrifice. The state-of-the-art defense tries to retain the…
Traditionally, power side-channel analysis requires physical access to the target device, as well as specialized devices to measure the power consumption with enough precision. Recently research has shown that on x86 platforms, on-chip…
Machine learning (ML) models can be trade secrets due to their development cost. Hence, they need protection against malicious forms of reverse engineering (e.g., in IP piracy). With a growing shift of ML to the edge devices, in part for…