Related papers: On decentralized computation of the leader's strat…
Stochastic dynamic teams and games are rich models for decentralized systems and challenging testing grounds for multi-agent learning. Previous work that guaranteed team optimality assumed stateless dynamics, or an explicit coordination…
This paper investigates a robust incentive Stackelberg stochastic differential game problem for a linear-quadratic mean field system, where the model uncertainty appears in the drift term of the leader's state equation. Moreover, both the…
We study policy optimization in Stackelberg mean field games (MFGs), a hierarchical framework for modeling the strategic interaction between a single leader and an infinitely large population of homogeneous followers. The objective can be…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…
Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…
This paper investigates the convergence of learning dynamics in Stackelberg games. In the class of games we consider, there is a hierarchical game being played between a leader and a follower with continuous action spaces. We establish a…
We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with target constraints. More precisely, we consider a…
Solving feedback Stackelberg games with nonlinear dynamics and coupled constraints, a common scenario in practice, presents significant challenges. This work introduces an efficient method for computing approximate local feedback…
In 1996, Mallozzi and Morgan [33] proposed a new model for Stackelberg games which we refer here to as the Bayesian approach. The leader has only partial information about how followers select their reaction among possibly multiple optimal…
Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain…
We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…
The pursuit of sustainability motivates microgrids that depend on distributed resources to produce more renewable energies. An efficient operation and planning relies on a holistic framework that takes into account the interdependent…
We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…
Information uncertainty is one of the major challenges facing applications of game theory. In the context of Stackelberg games, various approaches have been proposed to deal with the leader's incomplete knowledge about the follower's…
In this work, a novel Stackelberg game theoretic framework is proposed for trading energy bidirectionally between the demand-response (DR) aggregator and the prosumers. This formulation allows for flexible energy arbitrage and additional…
We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal…
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
Computational advertising has been studied to design efficient marketing strategies that maximize the number of acquired customers. In an increased competitive market, however, a market leader (a leader) requires the acquisition of new…
Deep learning is built on the foundational guarantee that gradient descent on an objective function converges to local minima. Unfortunately, this guarantee fails in settings, such as generative adversarial nets, that exhibit multiple…
The Stackelberg game model, where a leader commits to a strategy and the follower best responds, has found widespread application, particularly to security problems. In the security setting, the goal is for the leader to compute an optimal…