Related papers: Relying on the Metrics of Evaluated Agents
In many settings, an effective way of evaluating objects of interest is to collect evaluations from dispersed individuals and to aggregate these evaluations together. Some examples are categorizing online content and evaluating student…
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…
Revealed preference theory studies the possibility of modeling an agent's revealed preferences and the construction of a consistent utility function. However, modeling agent's choices over preference orderings is not always practical and…
Rideshare platforms exert significant control over workers through algorithmic systems that can result in financial, emotional, and physical harm. What steps can platforms, designers, and practitioners take to mitigate these negative…
We study the problem faced by a data analyst or platform that wishes to collect private data from privacy-aware agents. To incentivize participation, in exchange for this data, the platform provides a service to the agents in the form of a…
This paper looks at predictability problems, i.e., wherein an agent must choose its strategy in order to optimize the predictions that an external observer could make. We address these problems while taking into account uncertainties on the…
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure…
We study an online linear classification problem, in which the data is generated by strategic agents who manipulate their features in an effort to change the classification outcome. In rounds, the learner deploys a classifier, and an…
In this paper, we consider the revealed preferences problem from a learning perspective. Every day, a price vector and a budget is drawn from an unknown distribution, and a rational agent buys his most preferred bundle according to some…
As AI agents become more autonomous, properly aligning their objectives with human preferences becomes increasingly important. We study how effectively an AI agent learns a human principal's preference in choice under risk via stated versus…
An implicit expectation of asking users to rate agents, such as an AI decision-aid, is that they will use only relevant information -- ask them about an agent's benevolence, and they should consider whether or not it was kind. Behavioral…
Transparency and explainability are important features that responsible autonomous vehicles should possess, particularly when interacting with humans, and causal reasoning offers a strong basis to provide these qualities. However, even if…
A critical challenge in recommender systems is to establish reliable relationships between offline and online metrics that predict real-world performance. Motivated by recent advances in Pareto front approximation, we introduce a pragmatic…
Algorithmic transparency entails exposing system properties to various stakeholders for purposes that include understanding, improving, and contesting predictions. Until now, most research into algorithmic transparency has predominantly…
User models in information retrieval rest on a foundational assumption that observed behavior reveals intent. This assumption collapses when the user is an AI agent privately configured by a human operator. For any action an agent takes, a…
A measure of privacy infringement for agents (or participants) travelling across a transportation network in participatory-sensing schemes for traffic estimation is introduced. The measure is defined to be the conditional probability that…
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…
Online platforms in the Internet Economy commonly incorporate recommender systems that recommend products (or "arms") to users (or "agents"). A key challenge in this domain arises from myopic agents who are naturally incentivized to exploit…
In practice, incentive providers (i.e., principals) often cannot observe the reward realizations of incentivized agents, which is in contrast to many principal-agent models that have been previously studied. This information asymmetry…
Data collecting agents in large networks, such as the electric power system, need to share information (measurements) for estimating the system state in a distributed manner. However, privacy concerns may limit or prevent this exchange…