Related papers: Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revel…

Definable zero-sum stochastic games involve a finite number of states and action sets, reward and transition functions that are definable in an o-minimal structure. Prominent examples of such games are finite, semi-algebraic or globally…

We have proposed two new evolutionary rules on spatio-iterated games that is not mimic evolution of strategies, and mainly discussed the Prisoner's Dilemma game \cite{toyota2} by the two evoutionary rules \cite{toyota3}. In this paper we…

Despite increasing attention paid to the need for fast, scalable methods to analyze next-generation neuroscience data, comparatively little attention has been paid to the development of similar methods for behavioral analysis. Just as the…

This article presents the variant of the approach introduced in the recent work of Bensoussan, Wong, Yam and Yuan [13] to the generic first-order mean field game problem. A major contribution here is the provision of new crucial a priori…

We address the problem of mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games -- a novel setting using which many emerging problems in next-generation electricity markets can be readily modeled. Repeated playing affords the players a…

Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…

This paper is concerned with extending the notion of monotone solution to the mean field game (MFG) master equation to situations in which the coefficients are displacement monotone, instead of the previously introduced notion in the flat…

We develop a minimal, timeless game-theoretic representation of the mass-geometry relation. An "Object" (mass) and "Space" (geometry) choose strategies in a static normal-form game; utilities encode stability as mutual consistency rather…

We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard…

Applications in machine learning, optimization, and control require the sequential selection of a few system elements, such as sensors, data, or actuators, to optimize the system performance across multiple time steps. However, in…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

For nearly three decades, spatial games have produced a wealth of insights to the study of behavior and its relation to population structure. However, as different rules and factors are added or altered, the dynamics of spatial models often…

Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…

In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…

In this paper we examine fully nonlinear mean-field games associated with a minimization problem. The variational setting is driven by a functional depending on its argument through its Hessian matrix. We work under fairly natural…

An universal primal-dual approach of description equilibriums in large class of hierarchical congestion population games is proposed. At the very core of the approach is hierarchy of enclosed to each other transport networks. In different…

Nash equilibrium is often heralded as a guiding principle for rational decision-making in strategic interactions. However, it is well-known that Nash equilibrium sometimes fails as a reliable predictor of outcomes, with two of the most…

We present the notion of monotone solution of mean field games master equations in the case of a continuous state space. We establish the existence, uniqueness and stability of such solutions under standard assumptions. This notion allows…

We study first order evolutive Mean Field Games whose operators are non-coercive. This situation occurs, for instance, when some directions are `forbidden' to the generic player at some points. Under some regularity assumptions, we…

We study the existence of classical solutions to a broad class of local, first order, forward-backward Extended Mean Field Games systems, that includes standard Mean Field Games, Mean Field Games with congestion, and mean field type control…