Related papers: An evolutionary game with reputation-based imitati…
The environment undergoes perpetual changes that are influenced by a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Consequently, it exerts a substantial influence on an individual's physical and psychological state, directly or…
In real-world social systems, individual interactions are frequently shaped by reputation, which not only influences partner selection but also affects the nature and benefits of the interactions themselves. We propose a heterogeneous game…
The psychology of the individual is continuously changing in nature, which has a significant influence on the evolutionary dynamics of populations. To study the influence of the continuously changing psychology of individuals on the…
Keeping a high reputation, by contributing to common efforts, plays a key role in explaining the evolution of collective cooperation among unrelated agents in a complex society. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily an individual feature, but…
Previous research has shown how indirect reciprocity can promote cooperation through evolutionary game theoretic models. Most work in this field assumes a separation of time-scales: individuals' reputations equilibrate at a fast time scale…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…
Reputation and punishment are significant guidelines for regulating individual behavior in human society, and those with a good reputation are more likely to be imitated by others. In addition, society imposes varying degrees of punishment…
According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a…
Creating incentives for cooperation is a challenge in natural and artificial systems. One potential answer is reputation, whereby agents trade the immediate cost of cooperation for the future benefits of having a good reputation. Game…
Understanding and resolving cooperation dilemmas are key challenges in evolutionary game theory, which have revealed several mechanisms to address them. This paper investigates the comprehensive influence of multiple reputation-related…
People tend to have their social interactions with members of their own community. Such group-structured interactions can have a profound impact on the behaviors that evolve. Group structure affects the way people cooperate, and how they…
Indirect reciprocity maintains cooperation in stranger societies by mapping individual behaviors onto reputation signals via social norms. Existing theoretical frameworks assume static environments with constant resources and fixed payoff…
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations are strongly affected by updating rules. Previous studies usually focus on imitation-based rules, which rely on payoff information of social peers. Recent behavioral experiments suggest…
In this work we analyze how reputation-based interactions influence the emergence of innovations. To do so, we make use of a dynamic model that mimics the discovery process by which, at each time step, a pair of individuals meet and merge…
Cooperation underlies many natural and artificial systems. While voluntary participation can sustain cooperation without informational assumptions, real interactions are rarely anonymous, leaving the joint effects of participation and…
In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…
Imitation is an important learning heuristic in animal and human societies. Previous explorations report that the fate of individuals with cooperative strategies is sensitive to the protocol of imitation, leading to a conundrum about how…
Cooperation in human society is sustained by reputation. In general, the reputation of an individual is determined by others who observe his behavior, but this rarely happens in private situations. This may cause people to behave…
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a…