Related papers: Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary socia…
The community structure of complex networks reveals both their organization and hidden relationships among their constituents. Most community detection methods currently available are not deterministic, and their results typically depend on…
Gallice and Monz\'on (2019) present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. They demonstrate that in a sequential public goods game, where agents…
In many situations, the decision maker observes items in sequence and needs to determine whether or not to retain a particular item immediately after it is observed. Any decision rule creates a set of items that are selected. We consider…
Individual choices often depend on the order in which the decisions are made. In this paper, we expose a general theory of measurable systems (an example of which is an individual's preferences) allowing for incompatible (non-commuting)…
We prove decidability results on the existence of constant subsequences of uniformly recurrent morphic sequences along arithmetic progressions. We use spectral properties of the subshifts they generate to give a first algorithm deciding…
In social choice theory, anonymity (all agents being treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives being treated equally) are widely regarded as ``minimal demands'' and ``uncontroversial'' axioms of equity and fairness. However, the ANR…
We want to select the best systems out of a given set of systems (or rank them) with respect to their expected performance. The systems allow random observations only and we assume that the joint observation of the systems has a…
The act of explaining across two parties is a feedback loop, where one provides information on what needs to be explained and the other provides an explanation relevant to this information. We apply a reinforcement learning framework which…
Social choice has become a foundational component of modern machine learning systems. From auctions and resource allocation to the alignment of large generative models, machine learning pipelines increasingly aggregate heterogeneous…
Agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes; each agent likes or dislikes each outcome. We discuss three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator, is Strategyproof and…
Sequential allocation is a simple allocation mechanism in which agents are given pre-specified turns and each agents gets the most preferred item that is still available. It has long been known that sequential allocation is not…
We introduce a unified probabilistic framework for solving sequential decision making problems ranging from Bayesian optimisation to contextual bandits and reinforcement learning. This is accomplished by a probabilistic model-based approach…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. Similar impossibility results hold even if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness…
In the Possible Winner problem in computational social choice theory, we are given a set of partial preferences and the question is whether a distinguished candidate could be made winner by extending the partial preferences to linear…
We consider conditions that allow us to find an optimal strategy for sequential decisions from a given data situation. For the case where all interventions are unconditional (atomic), identifiability has been discussed by Pearl & Robins…
In problems involving the allocation of a single non-disposable commodity, we study rules defined on a general domain of preferences requiring only that each preference exhibit a unique global maximum. Our focus is on rules that satisfy a…
AI alignment and participatory design motivate a new democratic design problem: how to collectively choose a decision rule to use repeatedly. We study this problem for linear ranking rules, which repeatedly rank items $x_j$ within batches…
The sequential analysis of series often requires nonparametric procedures, where the most powerful ones frequently use rank transformations. Re-ranking the data sequence after each new observation can become too intensive computationally.…
Many high-stakes AI deployments proceed only if every stakeholder deems the system acceptable relative to their own minimum standard. With randomization over a finite menu of options, this becomes a feasibility question: does there exist a…