Related papers: Modifying an Instance of the Super-Stable Matching…
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
A matching queue is described via a graph $G$ together with a matching policy. Specifically, to each node in the graph there is a corresponding arrival process of items which can either be queued, or matched with queued items in neighboring…
The dynamical behavior of switched affine systems is known to be more intricate than that of the well-studied switched linear systems, essentially due to the existence of distinct equilibrium points for each subsystem. First, under…
This paper addresses the collision detection problem in population protocols. The network consists of state machines called agents. At each time step, exactly one pair of agents is chosen uniformly at random to have an interaction, changing…
One common type of symmetry is when values are symmetric. For example, if we are assigning colours (values) to nodes (variables) in a graph colouring problem then we can uniformly interchange the colours throughout a colouring. For a…
We study a practical two-sided matching problem of allocating children to daycare centers, which has significant social implications. We are cooperating with several municipalities in Japan and our goal is to devise a reliable and…
Finding a stable matching is one of the central problems in algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties and incomplete preferences, computing a stable matching of maximum cardinality is known to be NP-hard. In this…
We present a novel method for checking the Hurwitz stability of a polytope of matrices. First we prove that the polytope matrix is stable if and only if two homogenous polynomials are positive on a simplex, then through a newly proposed…
Since the early days of research in algorithms and complexity, the computation of stable matchings is a core topic. While in the classic setting the goal is to match up two agents (either from different "gender" (this is Stable Marriage) or…
Variational stability, in the sense of local good behavior of optimal values and solutions in problems of optimization under shifts in parameters, is important not only for validating model robustness in practical applications but also for…
Many problems in systems and control theory can be formulated in terms of robust D-stability analysis, which aims at verifying if all the eigenvalues of an uncertain matrix lie in a given region D of the complex plane. Robust D-stability…
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
We provide a framework to study stability notions for two-sided dynamic matching markets in which matching is one-to-one and irreversible. The framework gives center stage to the set of matchings an agent anticipates would ensue should they…
A key problem in verification of multi-agent systems by model checking concerns the fact that the state-space of the system grows exponentially with the number of agents present. This makes practical model checking unfeasible whenever the…
The Seat Arrangement Problem is a problem of finding a desirable seat arrangement for given preferences of agents and a seat graph that represents a configuration of seats. In this paper, we consider decision problems of determining if an…
The Stable Roommates problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SRTI) is a matching problem characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates, where the preferences may have ties or be incomplete. SRTI asks for a…
Since the introduction of the stable marriage problem (SMP) by Gale and Shapley (1962), several variants and extensions have been investigated. While this variety is useful to widen the application potential, each variant requires a new…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
In this paper we provide a first-ever epistemic formulation of stabilizing agreement, defined as the non-terminating variant of the well established consensus problem. In stabilizing agreements, agents are given (possibly different) initial…