Related papers: Weighted Myerson value for Network games

We introduce the component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for network games. This new value being a convex combination of the Myerson value and the component-wise equal division rule is a player-based allocation rule. In network games under…

A network game assigns a level of collectively generated wealth to every network that can form on a given set of players. A variable network game combines a network game with a network formation probability distribution, describing certain…

In Network games under cooperative framework, the position value is a link based allocation rule. It is obtained from the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game where the links of the network are considered players. The Shapley…

Network games provide a powerful framework for modeling agent interactions in networked systems, where players are represented by nodes in a graph and their payoffs depend on the actions taken by their neighbors. Extending the framework of…

We study public goods games played on networks with possibly non-reciprocal relationships between players. Examples for this type of interactions include one-sided relationships, mutual but unequal relationships, and parasitism. It is well…

Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…

We study binary-action pairwise-separable network games that encompass both coordinating and anti-coordinating behaviors. Our model is grounded in an underlying directed signed graph, where each link is associated with a weight that…

This paper considers a game-theoretic framework for distributed machine learning problems over networks where the information acquisition at a node is modeled as a rational choice of a player. In the proposed game, players decide both the…

This paper develops a distributed resource allocation game to study countries' pursuit of targets such as self-survival in the networked international environment. The contributions are two. First, the game formalizes countries' power…

In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral interaction is modeled as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw. We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that a…

In this work, we investigate an application of a Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm in a social network. In a networked game each player (user) takes action in response to other players' actions in order to decrease (increase) his cost…

We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium of constrained network aggregative games to changes in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the players. This setting is motivated by two applications. The first is the…

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…

A distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is presented for networked games. We assume an incomplete information available to each player about the other players' actions. The players communicate over a strongly connected digraph to…

We examine a naming game on an adaptive weighted network. A weight of connection for a given pair of agents depends on their communication success rate and determines the probability with which the agents communicate. In some cases,…

In this paper, we consider the problem of network design on network games. We study the conditions on the adjacency matrix of the underlying network to design a game such that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the social optimum. We…

Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…

We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…

We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…