Related papers: Generalized Principal-Agent Problem with a Learnin…
Inspired by real-time ad exchanges for online display advertising, we consider the problem of inferring a buyer's value distribution for a good when the buyer is repeatedly interacting with a seller through a posted-price mechanism. We…
A fundamental challenge for modern economics is to understand what happens when actors in an economy are replaced with algorithms. Like rationality has enabled understanding of outcomes of classical economic actors, no-regret can enable the…
In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal must design a contract to incentivize an agent to perform an action on behalf of the principal. We study the classical principal-agent problem in a setting where the agent can be of one…
We study the adversarial online learning problem and create a completely online algorithmic framework that has data dependent regret guarantees in both full expert feedback and bandit feedback settings. We study the expected performance of…
We consider a ubiquitous scenario in the Internet economy when individual decision-makers (henceforth, agents) both produce and consume information as they make strategic choices in an uncertain environment. This creates a three-way…
Regret analysis is challenging in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) primarily due to the dynamical environments and the decentralized information among agents. We attempt to solve this challenge in the context of decentralized…
We develop a meta-learning framework for simple regret minimization in bandits. In this framework, a learning agent interacts with a sequence of bandit tasks, which are sampled i.i.d.\ from an unknown prior distribution, and learns its…
In this paper, we consider a problem of contract theory in which several Principals hire a common Agent and we study the model in the continuous time setting. We show that optimal contracts should satisfy some equilibrium conditions and we…
An agent observes the set of available projects and proposes some, but not necessarily all, of them. A principal chooses one or none from the proposed set. We solve for a mechanism that minimizes the principal's worst-case regret. We…
In this paper, we introduce a distributed version of the classical stochastic Multi-Arm Bandit (MAB) problem. Our setting consists of a large number of agents $n$ that collaboratively and simultaneously solve the same instance of $K$ armed…
This paper presents a recursive reasoning formalism of Bayesian optimization (BO) to model the reasoning process in the interactions between boundedly rational, self-interested agents with unknown, complex, and costly-to-evaluate payoff…
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…
Models of economic decision makers often include idealized assumptions, such as rationality, perfect foresight, and access to all relevant pieces of information. These assumptions often assure the models' internal validity, but, at the same…
In this paper, we consider the time-varying Bayesian optimization problem. The unknown function at each time is assumed to lie in an RKHS (reproducing kernel Hilbert space) with a bounded norm. We adopt the general variation budget model to…
We consider a two-agent MDP framework where agents repeatedly solve a task in a collaborative setting. We study the problem of designing a learning algorithm for the first agent (A1) that facilitates a successful collaboration even in cases…
Recently, Daskalakis, Fishelson, and Golowich (DFG) (NeurIPS`21) showed that if all agents in a multi-player general-sum normal-form game employ Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update (OMWU), the external regret of every player is…
We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…
We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to…
Principal agent games are a growing area of research which focuses on the optimal behaviour of a principal and an agent, with the former contracting work from the latter, in return for providing a monetary award. While this field…
We present an approach for the quantification of the usefulness of transfer in reinforcement learning via regret bounds for a multi-agent setting. Considering a number of $\aleph$ agents operating in the same Markov decision process,…