Related papers: Efficient $\Phi$-Regret Minimization with Low-Degr…

We study stochastic linear optimization problem with bandit feedback. The set of arms take values in an $N$-dimensional space and belong to a bounded polyhedron described by finitely many linear inequalities. We provide a lower bound for…

Regret minimization is a general approach to online optimization which plays a crucial role in many algorithms for approximating Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. The literature mainly focuses on solving individual games in…

We study safe reinforcement learning in finite-horizon linear mixture constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) with adversarial rewards under full-information feedback and an unknown transition kernel. We propose a primal-dual policy…

The literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding predominantly focuses on single games or their repeated play. Nevertheless, numerous real-world scenarios feature playing a game sampled from a distribution of similar, but not identical…

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a family of algorithms for effectively solving imperfect-information games. To enhance CFR's applicability in large games, researchers use neural networks to approximate its behavior. However,…

We prove a new minimax theorem connecting the worst-case Bayesian regret and minimax regret under partial monitoring with no assumptions on the space of signals or decisions of the adversary. We then generalise the information-theoretic…

We give a randomized online algorithm that guarantees near-optimal $\widetilde O(\sqrt T)$ expected swap regret against any sequence of $T$ adaptively chosen Lipschitz convex losses on the unit interval. This improves the previous best…

We study regret minimization for infinite-horizon average-reward Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) under cost constraints. We start by designing a policy optimization algorithm with carefully designed action-value estimator and bonus term,…

We propose the first regret-based approach to the Graphical Bilinear Bandits problem, where $n$ agents in a graph play a stochastic bilinear bandit game with each of their neighbors. This setting reveals a combinatorial NP-hard problem that…

We study online learning in two-player uninformed Markov games, where the opponent's actions and policies are unobserved. In this setting, Tian et al. (2021) show that achieving no-external-regret is impossible without incurring an…

Regret minimization is a powerful method for finding Nash equilibria in Normal-Form Games (NFGs) and Extensive-Form Games (EFGs), but it typically guarantees convergence only for the average strategy. However, computing the average strategy…

We consider the classical problems of estimating the mean of an $n$-dimensional normally (with identity covariance matrix) or Poisson distributed vector under the squared loss. In a Bayesian setting the optimal estimator is given by the…

We consider the setting of online logistic regression and consider the regret with respect to the 2-ball of radius B. It is known (see [Hazan et al., 2014]) that any proper algorithm which has logarithmic regret in the number of samples…

We study the problem of dynamic regret minimization in online convex optimization, in which the objective is to minimize the difference between the cumulative loss of an algorithm and that of an arbitrary sequence of comparators. While the…

Most existing results about \emph{last-iterate convergence} of learning dynamics are limited to two-player zero-sum games, and only apply under rigid assumptions about what dynamics the players follow. In this paper we provide new results…

We consider regret minimization in repeated games with non-convex loss functions. Minimizing the standard notion of regret is computationally intractable. Thus, we define a natural notion of regret which permits efficient optimization and…

Correlated equilibria are a fundamental solution concept in game theory. However, despite decades of research, the complexity beyond games of polynomial type -- such as extensive-form games, congestion or routing games, and more broadly…

We introduce two new no-regret algorithms for the stochastic shortest path (SSP) problem with a linear MDP that significantly improve over the only existing results of (Vial et al., 2021). Our first algorithm is computationally efficient…

In a multi-follower Bayesian Stackelberg game, a leader plays a mixed strategy over $L$ actions to which $n\ge 1$ followers, each having one of $K$ possible private types, best respond. The leader's optimal strategy depends on the…

The CFR framework has been a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games in practice. However, the theoretical rate at which past CFR-based algorithms converge to the Nash equilibrium is on the order of $O(T^{-1/2})$, where…